

















despite  their  centrality  to understanding of  this period, historians have often
given their workplace activism superficial treatment.
Seeing  this  period as one where class solidarity  was eroded by  the  rise of
“privatism”,   scholars   have   been   unwilling   to   see   novelty   in   collectivism.
Consequently, car workers’ capacity for collective action has often been taken
for   granted,  with  mobilisation   attributed   to   a   combination   of   uncomplicated
economic   motivations,   the   last   gasps   of   a   declining   “traditional   class
consciousness”, and the effects of the post­war settlement. 
Existing   study   has   thus   suppressed   the   changing   forms   of   agency   and
subjectivity  expressed by  labour  militancy,  something  this   thesis   rectifies by
considering workplace activism  in   the motor   industry  as a specific  historical
creation of post­war Britain, rather than a reflection of “tradition”. Studying the




Turning   to   the   1960s   and   1970s   this   thesis   examines   in   detail   the   social








































































conflict,   with   strikes   increasing   in   frequency   and   number   of   participants,
particularly   between   1968   and   1974.1  The   same   period   also   saw   the
emergence and re­emergence of many tactics previously absent from industrial
relations,   including  political   strikes,  mass  pickets,  and   factory   occupations.2
These   were   accompanied   by   an   unprecedented   expansion   in   union




These developments   left  a  mark on Britain's  political  culture which  remains































organised   workers   to   disrupt   production,   influence   national   politics,
inconvenience the public and damage the economy, industrial relations became





Douglas Jay and Samuel  Brittan,  made the  inadequacies of   trade unionism
central to their diagnosis of Britain's apparently deteriorating economic position,
holding unions responsible for the inefficiencies of public corporations, lack of
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in   debates   over   other   trends   in   British   history.   Both   at   the   time   and
subsequently, scholars and commentators linked workplace conflict with other
key   historical   themes,   such   as   the   salience   of   class   and   occupation   as
identities, as well as other widely­discussed phenomena like the effects of the
post­war   settlement,   changing   gender   roles,   immigration   and   debates   over
“affluence” ­ the phenomenon of rising post­war working­class living standards.
Involving participation  in social  and political  mobilisation on a grander scale
than any other associative culture,  trade union activism potentially offers an
important   window   into   many   working­class   people's   experiences   of   these






This   thesis  will   take   as   its   subject   the   experiences   of   one   section   of   the
“organised working class” ­ car workers ­ who, perhaps more than any other
group,   found   themselves   at   the   centre   of   these   narratives.  Accounting   for
512,400   employees   at   the   industry's   peak,   the   British   motor   industry
experienced substantial  change between 1945 and 1977.10  After a period of
prosperity following the war, Britain's car firms fell one­by­one into difficulties
over   the   course   of   the   1960s   and   1970s.   Their   financial   troubles   were









shop­floor   activism   and   economic   instability   was   never   straightforward,
contemporary commentators regularly presented the former as the cause of the
latter. 
Such   developments   had   a   special   resonance   in   public   discourse.   As   the
quintessential industry of modernity, vehicle manufacture was often a metric by




been   contracting   since   before  World  War   Two,14  it   was   car   workers   who
featured most often in decline narratives and who faced comparisons with their
more   efficient   counterparts   overseas.15  With   high   wages   and   substantial
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the  nature  of   the   “social  power”   that   car  workers  held  as  a  group  and  as














working   lives   offers   an   important   insight   into   the   power   of   “the   organised






by  looking  at   the   records  of  workplace groups,   this   thesis  aims  to   improve
understanding   of   how   the   social   practices   they   developed   enabled   and
constrained their agency, structuring their ability to cooperatively shape their




Engagement with  new sources will  enable me to  disaggregate some of   the
many thousands of workers in the motor industry and develop a more nuanced
idea of what drove their participation in collective action, and critique some of




















drove   industrial   disorder   at   Chrysler's   Linwood   factory   between   1963   and
1981.22  Gilmour   concluded   that   unrest   often   consisted   of   'a   spontaneous
reaction to work allocation, supervision and working conditions',  with  tension
arising whenever management attempted to undermine skill and autonomy.23









Zeitlin   wrote   extensively   about   the  motor   industry   on   this   theme,   looking
principally  at   the ways  in  which  the strategies of  managements and unions
affected control over production.26
Beyond the motor industry, general works on post­war trade unionism are more






























unions   as   institutions,   the   two   volumes   edited   by  Campbell,   Fishman   and





Chris  Wrigley   on   the   role   of  women   and  Ken   Lunn   on   trade   unions   and
immigration. John McIlroy's two essays on far left factory activism and Foster
and   Woolfson's   contribution   on   shop­floor   pedagogy   in   the   Upper   Clyde


































34 Ralph Darlington and Dave Lyddon, Glorious Summer : Class Struggle in Britain, 1972   
(London: Bookmarks, 2001).












established  ideas.   In  Finding a Role  Brian  Harrison describes  life   in  Britain
between 1951 and 1970 as being structured around a broad political consensus
over   a   form  of   corporatism  marked  by   'the   continuous   interaction  between
governments,   employers   organisations   and   trade   unions'.37  The   latter  were
accepted as a 'true estate of the realm' after the war and would spend the years
to come engaged  in a utilitarian effort  to maximise  income'.38  Eventually  the
main expression of these attitudes – the defence of free collective bargaining –
came   to   undermine   corporatist   income   policies,   damaging   the   British
economy.39 Seeking a Role  continues in this vein, outlining how in the 1970s
'strikes mobilised the organized and the organizable against the rest', drawing
on   an   'anti­social  weapon'   to   hurt   the   public   and   extort  wage   increases.40
Harrison   then   charts   how   this   behaviour   continued   throughout   the  decade,
culminating   in   the  Winter  of  Discontent   in  1978­79   finally  discrediting   trade
union militancy and corporatism more generally.41
Drawing   on   stereotypical   industrial   relations   villains   –   short­sighted   “union

















Elsewhere,   Kenneth  Morgan   engages   in   the   same   discussions,   attributing
blame in different places.44 Paul Addison's No Turning Back draws on the same
basic conception of  the post­war settlement,  with  full  employment and  trade
union recognition generating fairly automatic material improvements for manual
workers.45  For  Addison,   'the  high   status   and  esteem enjoyed  by   the   trade
unions was a distinguishing feature of the 1940s and 1950s', spoiled only by
tensions  between   leaders  and   the   “rank  and   file”.46  As   the  post­war  period
progressed, Britain's attempts to establish a 'flourishing social democracy on
the West German or Swedish model' were thwarted during the 1960s and early
1970s  because   'the   trade  unions  were  unwilling  or  unable   to   participate'.47
Addison, like Harrison, argues that union militancy damaged the economy by
interrupting production and impeding changes in working practices.48
Both   authors   read   the   demise   of  militant   trade   unionism   backwards   from
Thatcherism, differing in that whilst Harrison is building a charge sheet, Addison
laments   the   inability   of   the   trade   unions   to   save   themselves   prior   to   the
backlash.49  No  Turning  Back  also   offers   an   alternative   explanation   for   the
changing patterns of industrial conflict. In place of Harrison's virtual silence on
why strike levels increased, Addison explains militancy primarily as a function of
inflation,   union   fragmentation   and   raised   expectations:   'The   trade   union
“movement” consisted in fact of thousands of separate and largely independent
bargaining  units  which  were   in  effect  competing  with  one another   in  a  pay













pathological,   but   finds   the   roots   of   this   dysfunction   primarily   in   inadequate







for   the   purposes   of   diagnosing   the   pathologies   of   Keynesian   corporatism,
scholars   like  Reid,   Pelling,   Laybourn   and  Wrigley   have   looked   to   reinsert








as   characterised   by   a   'progressive   liberalism'   sustained   throughout   the
movement's   existence,   with   militancy   explicable   as   an   understandable
response   to   economic   circumstances,   and   generally   an   effect   of   variable
employment levels.52  Events between 1945 and 1977 are incorporated into a
narrative   which   begins   in   the   1920s,   and   increasing   post­war   activism   is





demands   in   new  ways'.53  This   idea   that   British   trade   unions  were  mainly
concerned with “economism”, the pursuit of better wages to the exclusion of
almost  anything  else,   is  emphasised particularly   in   the  section  on   “process
workers”, in which the 'blunt economic pragmatism' of Joe Gormley, President






automatic   causes   of   collective  mobilisation,   rather   than  merely   favourable
contexts.   The  most   detailed   (and   convincing)   version  of   this   thesis   is   that
espoused by Chris Howell. Howell argues that in the opening decades of the




this system came under  increasing strain, as  'the absence of  institutions for























the   emphasis   is   largely   on   dismissing   accusations   of   political   extremism.
Subsequently   we   learn   of   the   conditional   nature   of   the   influence   of   the
Communist Party of Great Britain [CPGB], which was 'based mainly on their




kind   of   “economism”   discussed   above.   Reid's   description   of   the   miners'
attitudes toward trade unionism as being 'about industrial issues, above all the
size of   the  weekly  wage packet'  could equally  be  assumed  to  apply   to  car
workers.60
Part of the function of this discussion is to respond implicitly to the narrative
prominent at  the time  in which  industrial  unrest was attributed to “politically­
motivated militants”. In place of this Reid offers a vision of British workers at
mid­century with conventional views about the world responding to “genuine”
grievances  and   “industrial   issues”.61  Other   “voluntarist”  historians  engage   in
similar   exercises   in   absolving   trade   unionists   of   “political  motivation”,   each








economic demands and talks at  length about   the Socialist  Labour  League's
[SLL62] manipulation of workplace politics at British Leyland's Cowley assembly





For   instance,  Laybourn   looks   to   legitimise   industrial   action   by   referring   to
grievances   as   “genuine”   or   informing   us   that   particular   actions   were
“understandable  and  unsurprising”  given   the   issue  at   hand.64  Concepts   like




At   the   time,   trade   unions   were   widely   understood   to   be   “overmighty”,
particularly in the motor industry. As I have noted above, for many historians
this   authority   originated   in   the  post­war   settlement   and  was  wielded   in   an
uncomplicated manner by "trade unions" as institutions. Opposition to this idea



























For   instance,   the  question of   "trade union power"  as  posed by Taylor   robs
workers of much of their capacity to influence and shape events. By comparing
confederations in Britain, Sweden and Germany, the power being discussed
becomes   that   held   by   unions   as   institutions.   Yet   power   within   social
organisations   does   not   operate   in   simple   ways.   Organisations   that   fulfil
particular roles within corporate societies may wield considerable power within
bargaining processes, but decision­making and influence might be restricted to
leaders and relatively  inaccessible to the wider membership.67  The extent  to







are   invited   to   sit   on.   Furthermore,   workers   who   are   members   of   social
organisations   with   comparatively   weak   institutional   roles  may   still   exercise
considerable   influence  through  their  collective  social  power,  by  using  direct
action to transform conditions in their everyday lives.68 Potentially this last form
of power gives workers themselves more direct influence over workplace life






































“instrumental”  motivations;   that   is   economic   self­interest.   The   effect   of   this
analysis is to attribute to workers a sort of "negative subjectivity" in which we
learn   about   what   workers   did   not   believe   in,   rather   than   what   they   did.
Furthermore, what few details we do find on the nature of workers' ideas tend to
reduce militancy  to  “economic motivations"  and "industrial   issues",  with   little











with  one  detailed   investigation  of  how workers  constructed  collective  social
power. Beynon describes how over the course of the 1960s, worker activists at




organisation   developed,   the  workers  were   able   to   find   spaces   in  which   to




Although Ford's   rulebook granted  little   formal  power  to   the  stewards or   the
members they led, they developed a great deal of agency in shaping their lives
at work and beyond.  That social  power stemmed not   from the  formal rights
inscribed in the post­war settlement per se but actually from the contingent role
that collective action had carved out for them. For shop­floor representatives,
power  was  distinct   in   form   to   that  wielded  by  unions,  being  based  almost
entirely   on   their   role   in   workplace   culture.  Their   power   existed   because
stewards were entrusted over time with the task of representation, the result of
an agreement amongst workmates that such an arrangement enabled them to
articulate   grievances   in   the   face   of   an   employer   too   powerful   for   them   to
confront individually.74 This power was delegated from below, a position created
by   the  consensus  of   a  multitude  of   subjects  acting   in   concert.  This   act   of
creation afforded the shop steward certain powers to act  over  their members,













Regardless of economic conditions and political   reforms,  the unprecedented
level  of  activism  the  motor   industry   saw between  1945  and  1977  was  not
inevitable,   reflecting  Robert   Kuttner's   wider   assertion   about   the   contingent

























productive   forces.  Silver's  assertion   thus  holds   forth   the  possibility   that   the









industrial   relations   like   “fragmentation”   as   a   failing   of   the  wider   system   of





like   “sectional”   bargaining.   For   instance,   in   the   example   of   the  Halewood
stewards we can broadly  identify   three distinct  elements   that  structure  their
agency. Firstly there is the stewards' institutional role, which provides access to
a small  degree of   formal  authority  –   the  speaking and organisational   rights
78 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2006), p. 107; Karl Marx, Capital: A 
Critique of Political Economy Vol.1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 645.




negotiate  with  management   to  establish   the   terms under  which  work   takes







institutions  were   able   to   exercise   control   in  British   society.  Yet,   as  Angus
Stewart notes in his Theories of Power and Domination, studying power in this
way   (as   “power  over”   or   domination)   often  makes   it   difficult   to   understand
processes of change. Both formal power structures (like managerial  roles or
trade   union   positions)   and   totalising   disciplinary   regimes   (like   modes   of
production) tend to be fairly static.82  Hence whilst histories of trade unionism
have been able to identify phenomena like “union fragmentation” by describing
industrial   relations   institutions,   they   have   struggled   to   explain  where   these
social relations come from or why they change in the ways that they do. 












mutual   understanding   through   speech  acts,   establishing   shared  norms  and
interpretations   of   the   objective,   the   social   and   the   subjective   ­   producing
consensus.  A  lack  of  attention   to   the  dynamism of   this   final   form of  social
power, created “from below”, explains in part the static version of power that is





By separating  out   the   formal   institutional   role  occupied  by   trade  unions  as
disciplinary   structures   and   looking   at   the  more   contingent   forms   of   power
created through “communicative action”, we can acquire a greater sense of the
evolving   forms   of   workers'   power   in   this   period   and   how   they   shaped
perspectives and collective action. We can also begin to challenge assertions
about the cultural and social lives of workers in this period and step outside the
conventional  paradigms of  post­war   labour  history.  For   instance,   if  we view











Indeed,   this   is  made clear  even  in  studies  of   those groups  considered   the
archetype for “economistic” trade unionism. Vauxhall employees interviewed for
The Affluent Worker were identified as having an orientation towards a form of
“instrumental   collectivism”   in  which   little  moral   importance  was   invested   in
either  work   or   trade   unionism.85  Yet,   as  Savage   points   out,   their   attitudes
revealed a very specific type of calculation of economic self­interest, as distinct
from   the   ideas  of  middle­class  professionals   as   it  was   from   the   supposed










determining  whether   collective   action   could   be   financially   justified  were   so
complex  and   contradictory   that   straight  economistic   judgements  were  often
impossible.88 Balancing lost wages and disruption to production against future
increases and  industrial   leverage,  out of  necessity collective decisions often
drew on notions of fairness and justice rather than pragmatic calculation. At no
point were “economic interests” straightforward or simply apparent.













can   only   be   ideological',   that   is,   reflective   of   only   one   ideal   of   economic
rationality.91 Godelier looked to unpick the ways in which ostensibly universal
rationalities   actually   functioned   according   to   a   society's   prevailing   values
(ideology), as opposed to any universal notion of the economic. This lack of
universality   contains   an   insight   which   potentially   sheds   light   on   both   the
aversion   to   certain   types  of  economic   rationality  displayed  by  Goldthorpe's





apathy   also   generate   more   questions   than   answers,   despite   their   basic
empirical validity. For  instance, although their party members were always a
tiny minority, the workplace was a sphere in which far left groups obtained and
sustained  far  more  influence  than  in  other  parts  of  British  life.92  From 1951















and  1977.93  Although  an   instrumental  preference   for   strong  bargainers  was
certainly an important aspect of relationships between Communist activists and
members, it was not the only element that defined such interactions. Foster and
Woolfson's  work  on   the  Upper  Clyde  Shipbuilders  work­in   shows  one  very
detailed  example  of  how Communists  could  shape discussions,  with  CPGB
members at the yards key to determining the workers' responses to proposed





of   the  word   "political"  and  the   relationship  between workplace activism and
radical political parties of the left. For instance, many of the workers interviewed






















Regarding   the   1964­70   Labour   government   another   Halewood   steward









apathy and even hate  towards “politics”  tout court  was a substantial  part  of
British   “political   culture”   in   this   period   and   that   'the   definition  of  what  was
“political” was itself loaded and contested' in many areas of British life.97 
Given that, as H.A. Clegg notes, even during the “high tide” of labour militancy
'striking   was   an   exceptional   habit'   and   one   which   met   with   increasing
disapproval   in  mainstream public   discourse,98  consideration  of   car  workers'
historically­specific perception of the "political", "industrial" and "economic" has
been neglected. Explaining the ideas behind post­war workplace culture in the







self­interest.  Unpicking what kind of motivations sustained  industrial  activism
amongst   these   “exceptional”  minorities   involves   understanding   not   just   the
stated   reasons   for   particular   actions,   but   also   the   micro­cultures   which
produced them. In this regard Pierre Bourdieu's work on social practices and
habitus proves instructive. Scholars often draw on Bourdieu's best known book
Distinction  as   a   way   of   reflecting   on   taste   and   life­style   as   classed   and
classifying  aspects   of  modern   societies.99  In   this  way  historians  and  social








those  uses  offer   for   change.  Bourdieu  argues   that   although  an   individual's
behaviour  within   their  habitus  is   subject   to   constraints   ­   'limits  set   by   the
historically and socially situated conditions of its [the habitus'] production'101  ­
they can still pursue an infinite number of actions, though with a tendency to
'generate   all   the   “reasonable”,   “common­sense”,   behaviours...   which   are
possible  within   the   limits   of   these   regularities,   and  which   are   likely   to   be

















symbolic   interests'.103  Continuously   created,   the   rules   of   such   cultures   are
interruptible at any stage, with sudden breaks  in practice possible whenever
'subversive   action'   is   able   'to   bring   to   consciousness,   and   so  modify,   the
categories of thought which help to orient individual and collective practices'.104
Such   ideas   have   obvious   applications   for   understanding   labour   militancy,
particularly in light of the discussion of power above. If we consider particular
workplaces as a kind of habitus, within which certain behaviours (say striking or
electing   communists)   took  on   the  appearance  of   “reasonable”   or   “common






collective   behaviour   during   earlier,   less   conflictual,   phases   of   industrial
relations. Finally, by thinking of the workplace in this way, we can begin to see





















lowest   common   denominators   of   “apathy”   and   “economic   self­interest”,
neglecting to disaggregate the rich variety of ideas that characterised shop­floor
activism or to historicise changing notions of the political and the economic. 

























and 1960s,  not  nostalgia   for  a  white  working­class  community  disrupted by
urban regeneration, changing gender relations and migration, but the gradual
emergence of new subjectivities and new communities.108 Ben Jones paints a








































careful  attention  to   their  absences,   these  texts  also give us  access  to  vital










like   “economism”,   and   “apathy”   currently   central   to  existing  explanations  of







However,   they  were   also   deliberately   pitched   in   ways  which   reflected   the
authors'   intimate   knowledge   of   both   their   audience   and   their  habitus,   and
therefore inadvertently reveal important cultural norms. 
Oral history will be used with due consideration of the conditions under which it
was   produced   and   of   the  ways   interviewers   and   interviewees   constructed




















useful.  With   the majority  of  participants still  employed  in   the motor   industry
when   they  were   interviewed,   and   the   now   conventional   narrative  of   1970s
Britain   less   fixed   in   public  memory,   these   accounts   were   able   to   provide
valuable detail  on the functioning and meaning of workplace activism at that
time, provided by workers with recent experience of it. The precise moment at




have   ideally   incorporated   the   interviews  conducted   for  The Affluent  Worker





dealt with  in these interviews, I  felt  it was impractical, given time and space



















propaganda,  oral   interviews   focused  on work  –   reflect   this   focus and have
inevitably shaped the conclusions I have reached. However, I recognise that
the   radical   separation   of   work   and   home   implied   by   this   approach   is
unsustainable, workers inevitably brought priorities, problems and ideas into the







the   1960s   and   1970s  which  have   largely   ignored   the  workplace.114  In   this
context,   research   aimed   at   filling   this   gap   is   a   legitimate   endeavour.   An
exhaustive exploration of the ways in which the changing world outside shaped
factory activism would be a useful contribution to the field, but one that would
struggle   to   co­exist   within   the   same   doctoral   dissertation   as   the   detailed










largely   through national  newspapers,  political  speeches,  government  reports
and  popular   non­fiction   social   commentary.  The  purpose   of   this   chapter   is
simple but  crucial.  Since my argument  is   that  workers'  power  in  this period
should not be taken for granted, I need to illustrate the ways in which workplace
activism escaped the formal boundaries imposed by the dominant culture of the
period.  This   chapter   will   expand   upon   the   idea   that   car   workers   found







workers   under   “Fordism”,   the   ability   to   articulate   a   collective   interest   and
mobilise  behind  it  was still   largely  absent  even after  1945.   In   line  with   the
discussion of power above, I will argue that rather than a combination of the





understand   the  nature  of   the  shop­floor   social  power  workers  had  created.
Using analysis of the new sources discussed above, which record individual










not  as problems  to  be solved but  as particular   forms of  organisation which
enabled workers to exercise certain kinds of agency.
Finally,   in   Chapter   Five   I   will   turn   to   the   cultural   values   and   “pragmatic
rationalities”   (the   framework   for   calculative   reasoning)   generated   by   these
shop­floor cultures. I will argue that the form of car workers' social power at
sectional level substantially moulded the attitudes and ideas that they employed
at  work,   in  ways   that  cannot  be   readily  understood  as  analogous   to   those
embedded in wider public discourse. Arguing that attitudes towards trade union
militancy were so hostile in mainstream public discourse that strikes in effect















Trade   unionism  developed   in   post­war  Britain   in   a  wider   context   in  which
hostility   toward   labour   militancy   steadily   increased   in   mainstream  public




deeper economic problems.  In  the wake of a series of government defeats  in
that decade,  journalists dedicated ever more attention  to  industrial unrest and
commentary on the subject became increasingly aggressive, particularly with
regard to the relatively well­paid car workers.
As   I   noted   in   the   introduction,   following   this   demonisation  much   historical
scholarship has been dedicated to reinserting trade unionists into the historical
mainstream,  and  to  defending  their  activism as a conventional   response  to
changing economic conditions.116 The aim of this chapter is to chart the evolving
nature of public discourse during this period in order to challenge this narrative
on   a   fundamental   level.  Rather   than   attempting   to   use  the   economic
motivations that underpinned militancy to make the case that it was in essence
“reasonable   collective   bargaining”,   I   will   argue   that   regardless   of   how
“reasonable” workers wished to appear at this time, the social practices of much
post­war   workplace   activism   were   increasingly   seen   as   transgressive   to
mainstream social  norms.  Although  post­war  Britain  encouraged  workers   to
engage in collective bargaining, my argument is that between 1945 and 1977





period   progressed   and   as   such,   the   nature   of   this   criticism   raises   crucial
questions about how activists sustained such behaviour in the face of general
hostility. That many of the participants in these events saw their behaviour as







discussions of  workplace activism.  Even  in   the  1940s,  workers  who  flouted
official industrial relations procedures were criticised, both in the national and
local  press, as well  as by politicians.  Building on  these  ideas  in  the 1960s,
industrial   relations   reformers   looked   to   combat   so­called   “unofficial   strikes”
through   new   legislation,   hoping   to   secure   industrial   discipline,   and   with   it




their   place   as   “wreckers   of   the   nation”.   Far   from   union   activism   being
“mainstream”, as the post­war period progressed workers who participated in














the   immediate  post­war  period   the  national  press  ostensibly  held   the   trade
union   movement   in   high   regard.   Ben   Jackson   has   even   argued   that
'questioning the virtue of organised labour' in the 1940s was 'toxic' to the liberal
intelligentsia and the political class.118  Many commentators hailed not  just  its
key role in war­time production but also its peacetime contribution to defending








In   general,   public   discourse   reflected   the   'unprecedented   sympathy'   of   the
British   state   towards   the   working   class   which   Jackson   attributes   to   this
period,120 with outright public criticism of union power generally being restricted












out   the   norms   that   “reasonable”   and   “moderate”   trade   unionists   would   be
expected  to  adhere   to   in   the years  to  come.  Although workers'   rights  were
widely understood to be fundamental to democracy, the circumstances under
which   they   could   be   exercised   were   limited.   Specifically,   there   was   the
expectation that where industrial relations machinery existed it should be used,
and   strikes  which   fell   foul   of   these   norms  were   subjected   to   considerable
criticism. 
For instance, The Times noted of a 1949 walkout by bus and tram workers that
'London's   transport  workers   have   fought   strikes   in   the   past   in  which   they
deserved and gained the sympathy of the public. To­day's strike is not of that




inconveniencing   the   public,   but   also   for   'discrediting   the   trade   union
movement'.123 
Although Laybourn has argued that World War Two generated a 'consensus'
regarding   the   benefits   of   trade   unionism,124  members   who   engaged   in











strikes”   ­   strikes   organised   without   official   trade   union   support126  –   could
sometimes  be  harsh.  One  by  London  dockers  saw  them described   in  The
Times  as   'a   band   of   stupid   or   defiant   men'   who   had   'deliberately   taken
advantage of their key place in the country's traffic to put the subsistence and
supplies   of   their   fellow­countrymen   in   peril'.127  A  walkout   by   2,500   London
power­workers saw participants described as 'wilful... selfish and irresponsible'
for   their  willingness   to   disrupt   public   services,  echoing  attitudes   that  would
become an important part of trade union pathology in the years to come.128 
Although columnists  often acknowledged  the  limitations of  existing  industrial
relations   machinery,   even   Left­leaning   papers   still   expected   workers   to
participate in it, criticising those that did not on a moral basis.129 Groups like
dockers were a particular target because their strikes inflicted instant hardship
by   interrupting   vital   food   supplies.  Car   workers  were   usually   spared   such

























headline  'Reds behind strikes',  an exclamation  fairly   typical  of   its stories on
industrial   relations.133  Elsewhere,   criticism   of   the   CPGB's   role   in   industrial









post­war coverage of  industrial   relations, although considerable, was usually























mark  discussion  of   trade  unionism  in   the  decades   to  come.  Worries  about
“unofficial” strikes were already beginning to emerge, hinting at the narratives




union   esteem,   shop­floor   bargaining   of   the   sort   that  would   emerge   in   the
following   decades   was   seen   as   transgressive.   Only   the   relatively   closed
negotiations  involving employers and union officials  ­   “external  bargaining”  ­
were   regarded  as   “legitimate”   trade  unionism.136  Workers   in   the  docks  and













industries,138  coupled  with  the  perception  that  union  influence,  particularly  in
manufacturing,  was  deepening,  as  shop­floor  organisations  became   more
entrenched.139 A shift in the perception of the motor industry became apparent




reported   the   juicier   details   about   the   'influence   of   reds'   at   Dagenham,
highlighting the politics of individual stewards like John McLoughlin.141 
Although it was the perceived Communist influence that peaked tabloid interest
in   the   strike,   it   was   the  more   conventional   norms   emerging   on   collective
bargaining which would ultimately focus attention on the motor industry. In the
media and in government policy­making, one concept came to define industrial
unrest   in  Britain  as  uniquely  unhealthy   ­   the   “unofficial”   strike,  any walkout
outside   official   procedure   or   not   officially   sanctioned   by   the  workers'   trade
union. These constituted 95 per cent of all recorded disputes between 1960 and
1968.142 Critics saw these strikes as a particularly damaging form of industrial














well  in  advance  –  and,  if  necessary  prepare  for  it.  In  these
circumstances  there  is  less  likelihood  of  an  early  impact  on  their
customers, on other industries, or the public at large.143 
The  idea that British workers were uncontrollable, particularly when compared
to   supposedly  industrious  Swedes   and   Germans  abiding  by  their  rational
“comprehensive  agreements”,  was  a  concept  that  would  only  get  stronger
during the 1960s.144
This disruption aside, the “unofficial” nature of many strikes reinforced criticism
of  trade  unions  largely  because  of  their  perceived  “unreasonableness”.  In
referring  to  discipline  and  bargaining  structures  as  “official  procedure”  many
commentators  gave  agreements  and  rulebooks  a  quasi­legal  status  which
meant  that  breaching  them  was  often perceived  as  a  pseudo­criminal  act  of
rebellion.  For  Conservative  MP  Robert  Carr  “unofficial”  strikes  posed  a
particular  problem  and  he  expressed  a  desire  to  'strengthen  the  authority  of
official,  constitutionally­appointed  union  leadership  relative  to  that  of  the
unofficial elements whose uncontrolled activities are at present one of the main
causes  of  …  disorder'.145  Whilst   such  concerns started  with  employers  and
politicians, they were driven home in the tabloid, broadsheet and local press,
and even by trade union leaders, who largely agreed with employers on the











Beyond   its  disorderly  nature,  central   to   the  national  preoccupation  with   the
“plague  of  unofficial  strikes”  was  the  supposed  effect  that  they  had  on
managerial  decision­making.  More  than  “normal”  official  action, according  to
Donovan   Report  the  possibility  of  a  “lightning”  walkout   meant   that  'some
managements lack confidence that the plans they make and the decisions they
reach can be implemented rapidly and effectively or, in extreme cases, at all.'147
Similar  fears  were  expressed  in  The  Guardian  in   1960,  demonstrating  the
longevity of fears around shop­floor militancy and industrial  inertia;  'the fear of
“what might happen”  if  this or that were done to forestall a strike, or  to  lessen







of  trade  unions.  Rather  than  any  potential  threat  to  democracy,  organised
labour  was  feared  for  its  capacity  to  halt  economic  progress  and  exacerbate
Britain's relative decline. In 1961, long before the debate on industrial relations
became  the  urgent  political  issue,   social   commentator  Michael  Shanks
described  the  trade  unions  as  'the  greatest  institutional  barrier  to  Britain's
becoming  a  genuine  dynamic  society'.149  Shanks  accused  trade  unionists  of
“modern luddism”, highlighting their lack of interest in productivity. Three years
before  Harold Wilson won  the  1964  election  with the promise of  a “scientific
revolution”, Shanks argued that workers' organisations were now standing in
the way of Britain's industrial progress.  Unable to grasp that future prosperity










of  this debate over efficiency was  the venerable  idea of  “restrictive practices”,
defined  by  Donovan  as  any  'rules  or  customs  which  unduly  hinder[ed]  the
efficient use of  labour',151 specifically referencing four principal features ­  time­
wasting to ensure overtime would be available, overmanning and the under­use
of  “mates”,  the  acceptance  of  low  standards  of  work  as  normal,  and  poor
timekeeping.152  Donovan's  report   left  the  description  of  “restrictive  practices”
vague,  retaining  the  feel  of  technical  vocabulary  whilst  remaining  ambiguous
enough  to  encompass  everything  from  generic  idleness  to  complicated
apprenticeship arrangements and closed­shop rules.
In concrete terms what worried many commentators was “over­manning”. For
instance,  one  editorialist  claimed  in 1967 that  the  steel  industry  retained an
excess   of   100,000   workers   as   a   consequence  of  'spasmodic  industrial
unrest'.153 Unions were accused of using their power on the shop floor to keep
workers  under­used,  preventing  the  dynamic  reallocation  of  labour.  The











always unions as institutions) to be  engaged  in  an  irrational  defence  of  old­
fashioned and counter­productive privileges, launching damaging disputes over
trivialities   and  damaging  their  employers  and  the  nation.  By  1968  such
concerns  formed   part   of  a  recognisable  national  narrative  of  the  'British
malaise:  the  stick­in­the­mud,  inefficient  ways  of  running  our  industry  which
have  allowed  our  living  standards,  no  longer  subsidised  by  cheap  colonial
labour, to fall behind.'155 
In the early 1960s, these criticisms were expressed with particular vigour with
regards   to   the  motor   industry,   with   concern   regarding   car   firms'   industrial
relations   surging  after   repeated  parliamentary  courts   of   inquiry  and   regular







Britain   as  a   “modern”   industrialised  nation.  Thus   the  deficiencies  of  British
motor   firms,   where   productivity   had   largely   stagnated   between   1955   and
1965,159 were often taken as signs of a more general decline. Workers' refusals
to   abide   by   official   procedures   and   their   readiness   to   defend   “restrictive













union  members  and  of  the  “conscientious  objector”   ­   principled   non­trade­




The  newspapers  reported  that  in  the  wake  of  one  unofficial  strike,  a  works
committee160  meeting  had  constituted  itself  as  a  workers'  court  and  sat  in
judgement on members who had refused to participate. The stewards, some of
them  members  or  sympathisers  of  the  Trotskyist  SLL  had  sentenced  their
fellow workers  to  a  small  fine, apparently under the shadow of a noose. The

















how   they   understood   the   activities   they   participated   in,   found   themselves
contravening the social norms as laid down by the two dominant political parties
and by virtually  all  national  daily newspapers.  On occasion,   the activities of
factory  organisations  like  BMC Service  works  committee  even saw workers
subjected to direct attack from politicians and press. However, public discourse




Editorials written about  strikes often  strove  to  balance  the grievances of both
sides, and newspapers regularly published letters by trade unionists explaining
their  cases.162  Debates  around  industrial  relations  did  focus  on  the  need  to




For instance, in one  January 1960 editorial  complaining at  the state of motor
industry labour relations, The Times outlined how the previous year had been
the worst  on  record  for  strikes. Although evidently worried about  this  state of
affairs,  the article was careful  to apportion blame equitably: ‘on  the one hand
the labour policy of some of the firms is inadequate and on the other... groups
of  shop  stewards  are  deliberately  fostering  trouble'.163  The  writer  went  on  to














post­war   period,   principally   concerned   with   defining   legitimate   workplace
activism and the 1965­68 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers
Organisations was fairly typical of these tendencies. The  appointment  of  the
commissioners,  with  two  trade  unionists  –  Alfred  Robens  and  George
Woodcock  –  and  two  liberal  industrial  relations  scholars  –  Otto  Kahn­Freund
and  H.A.  Clegg  –  demonstrated  that   the  “trade  union  problem”  remained  a
matter  for  reform rather than a crisis, and it was only later that more alarmist
calls  to  “take  on  the  union  barons”  would  become   central   to   the  debate.
Although  such  opinions  had  a  presence  in  public  life,  they  were  largely
marginalised  and  the  Donovan  Report  was  careful  to  assert  that  industrial
relations  were  not  in  the  grip  of  unmanageable  chaos,  stressing  that  the
number  of  strikes  in  Britain  was  not  especially  high  in  comparison  to  other
industrialised  nations.165  The  report  even  emphasised  its  appreciation  of  the
much­maligned car  plant  shop  steward:  'Our  clear  impression … is  that  shop
stewards  in  the motor  industry,  like  shop  stewards  elsewhere,  are  in  general
hard­working and responsible people who are making a sincere attempt to do a
difficult  job.'166  In each of  its  conclusions,  the  report emphasised  the extent  to
which minor reforms ­ not  including sanctions,  legally enforceable contracts or
trade union liability ­ would solve the majority of problems in industry. 
Clearly   then,   in   the  1960s,  many   commentators   still   believed   in   a   form  of





manifestations   of   worker   activism   diverged   from   it.  Indeed,  editorialists,
newspaper  letter­writers,  politicians  and  government  reports  all  continued  to
acknowledge an abstract “right to withdraw one's  labour” as necessary for  the
effective exercise of civil liberties.167  As in the previous period, ideas of healthy
workplace activism drew on norms which divided  the “reasonable”   from  the
“unreasonable”   and  although  outright  support  from  mainstream  public
commentary  for particular  strikes was  rare,  the ways  in which  trade unionists
defended disputes reveal the qualities that such an event might be expected to
have.  Taking  the  1966  National  Union   of  Seamen  strike  as  one  example,
correspondents were keen to emphasise the difficulty that long hours on­board
ship  entailed   for  seamen.  Other  letters  noted  that  seamen  were  badly­paid
relative to factory workers and in comparison with seamen in other countries.168
The Times editorial on 16 April accepted many of the arguments presented by
the  seamen,  agreeing  that  their  pay  was  insufficient  considering  the
inconvenience of their work. The normative aspect of such qualified support is
confirmed by  the same paper's outright  rejection of another  claim put  forward
by  the  National  Union  of  Railwaymen  earlier  that  year,  on  the  grounds  that
railworkers  were  adequately  remunerated  and  the  industry  itself  was  not
“paying its way”.169
The differing reception of the railworkers and seamen's  “genuine  grievances”




















Although  these  ideas were never  related  to car workers  in  this  period,  they
would become increasingly important in the 1970s, as economic problems saw
car firms being bailed out, subsidised and nationalised. 
Normative   expectations   for   negotiations   began   to   reflect   these   sorts   of
calculations, reflecting the growing importance of “productivity bargaining”. This
ideal of  industrial  relations, where managers raised pay and conditions  in  line
with increased output, based itself firmly on a “productivist” notion of economic
rationality.  As  efficiency  in  the  factory  rose  and  each  worker  became  more
productive,  the wealth of  the firm and the nation  increased, allowing for better
living  standards.  The  Donovan  Report  was  a   key   advocate  of   this   sort   of
agreement, paying particular attention to what it saw as “best practice” at three
firms;  ICI,  Esso  and  The  Steel  Company  of  Wales,   each   praised   by   the
Commission   for   introducing  work­study  based  manning,  more  efficient  work
practices, flexibility in task division, the abolition of output limitation, as well as
suppressing  tea  breaks  and   other  interruptions,  and   securing  worker
acceptance of some redeployment and redundancy.170 These firms, in essence,
exchanged  higher   pay   for  higher  output   from  a  smaller  workforce,  through
making  their  employees  work  harder  and  in  more  flexible  ways.  Such
agreements   were   particularly   advocated   for   the   increasingly   uncompetitive






From  the perspective of many commentators,  the pay  rises handed out  to an
amorphous army of manual workers, seemingly as a reward for their collective
belligerence,  had   always  seemed  unfair  in  comparison  to  the  middle­class
conception  of  “getting  on”  based  on  individual  merit,   an   injustice   often
mentioned when white­collar workers such as teachers or civil servants went on
strike.172 The  ideal of productivity bargaining  ­  swapping  increased effort  for a
rise in  real wages – appeared to  fit with  the ideal of  “meritocracy”, where the
hardest  working  and most  useful  would  prosper,  an   idea  that  Ben Jackson
argues   was   becoming   increasingly   important   even   to   many   left­wing
egalitarians at this time.173  The  pathology  of  labour  militancy,  where  workers
obtained greater  rewards  through  refusing  to co­operate with  their employers,
rejecting  the  official  industrial   relations  procedures  and  neglecting  economic





they   participated   in  were   regarded   in  most   sectors   of   public   discourse   as
outside these norms and by 1969 even figures ostensibly on the Left of the
Labour  Party   like  Barbara  Castle,  were  openly  wondering   if   free   collective











1970s.   For   workers,   particularly   for   active   “militants”,   organising   collective






By 1968  industrial  relations had become one of  the most significant  issues  in
national  politics,  vying with  cost  of  living and unemployment  in  polls  on  voter
priorities.175 The number of disputes then rose sharply, remaining high until the
mid­1980s, with peaks in 1972, 1974 and 1979. Disputes reached new areas of
industry176  and   there  was  a  sharp  upturn  in  the  number  of  major  strikes  –
involving more  than  five  thousand striker days  ­ with over one  thousand such
disputes  recorded  between  1969  and  1973.177  With  a  changing  pattern  of






















strikes  ­  diminished  in  importance  in  the  late  1960s  and  the  1970s,  as  the
disruptive  effects  of  unsanctioned walkouts  began  to  seem  less  significant  in
the  face  of  more  large,  official  strikes.180  Despite  the   two main  government
industrial reform projects ­ In Place of Strife181 and the 1971 Industrial Relations
Act  ­  aiming  to prevent  “lightning  strikes”,  by  the  time  the  latter was  passed,
commentary  on  the matter  had   virtually  ceased, with  The Times  mentioning
this aspect of workplace conflict  in  just  two editorials in 1970 and not at all  in




















miners'  strike,  which threatened electricity supplies,  and disruption continued
with a strike of hospital  ancillary workers  in  1973,  and  the  introduction of  the









less  than  cosmic  disaster...  Outside  there,  in  the  darkness,  the
nation  has  been  utterly  paralysed  for  week  upon  week;  invalids
dependent upon “continuously operating” kidney­machines lived two
or three to every street; armed robbers prowled the darkness; not a
hospital  in  the  country  that  was  not  lit  solely  by  candles,  with
surgeons  operating  upon month­old  babies  by  the  light  of  a  failing
torch.185












thirty  letters  on  the  subject,  worrying   about  hospital  patients,  mothers  and
babies, the elderly and the various bleak possibilities  that could befall them in
the darkness.186
Parallel   to   this  narrative   ran   the   idea,  particularly   important   in   the  ongoing




which   national   newspapers   rallied   behind   what   they   called   'The   Miller
Movement', a group of car workers' wives angry about their husbands losing
pay through strikes. The leader of the campaign, Carol Miller, briefly became a
front page  feature  in  tabloid newspapers that supported her crusade.187  The
idea   of   the   wives   campaign   was   that   constant   strikes,   organised   by   a
troublemaking minority, were making it impossible for laid­off workers and their


























politicians  expressed  fears over  the nature of picketing.  The  Observer  even
included  the  events  of  Shrewsbury  and  Saltley  alongside  the   troubles   in
Northern  Ireland  in  a  feature  on  “political  violence”.191  Such   controversy
followed  even  when  it  was  the  policing   rather   than   the  picketing  that  was
aggressive, as was the case in the strike over union recognition at Grunwick in
1976. Despite the majority of the actual violence later being attributed to the
Metropolitan Police,192  the mere presence of a “mass picket”  led to reports  of
yet another incident of militant bullying.193 For many commentators, a peaceful
picket,  was,   at   best,    permitted  to  consist  of  small  numbers  attempting  to
persuade pedestrians and open­minded drivers to stop and talk before entering
their workplace.194















votes   impossible.195  Even  where   critics   approved   of   the   results   of   such









These  narratives  of  interference  with  basic  liberties  fused  with  more  general
concerns surrounding the state of the country. Police helplessness in the face
of  large numbers of pickets and  their allies  raised  the spectre of  lawlessness,
particularly in light of the inability of the Heath government to secure obedience
to  the 1971  Industrial Relations Act.197  The  perceived  lack  of  respect  for  any
kind  of  authority,  even  that  of an elected government,  was  relatively  easy  to
combine  with  other  preoccupations  of  the  socially  conservative and  fed  into
more  general  ideas  regarding  Britain's  economic  and  geopolitical  decline.  As
Jim Tomlinson notes, although narratives of declinism were broader than mere






these  critiques.198  As   commentators  pointed   to  Britain's   comparatively   slow




the unions were  'probably  the major cause, of Britain's dreadful  record of  low




1  and  Figure  2  [see  over]   show,   the   jokes  often  hinged  on   the   supposed
laziness of motor industry strikers and the damage they inflicted on the nation.
The  August   1970   cartoon  depicting   the  motor   unions   as   flat­capped   pigs,





Figure 1: British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent [Hereafter 
BCA], Michael Cummings, Evening Standard ((c) Express 





In  these cartoons  laziness  was  added  to  the  familiar  1960s accusations  of
restrictive practices, deliberate overmanning and opposition to new technology.
Such ideas connected  easily with other features of British declinism, like the
concept  of  the  “lame  duck”  enterprise;  those  companies  whose  survival
depended on government subsidies. As the 1970s progressed, the perception
that the government was endlessly shovelling money into a bottomless pit to
support  nationalised  industries  with   indolent  workforces had become almost
ubiquitous  in  much  of  public  discourse  and  epitomised  by   the  national   car
company – British Leyland. One newspaper column in 1978, written by liberal






Figure 2: BCA, Michael Cummings, Evening Standard ((c) 





went   beyond   criticism   of   “militants”.   However   moderate   a   worker   might
understand their trade unionism to be, by the mid­1970s they were no longer
excluded from the kind of broad criticism shown in Figure 3. Stanley Franklin's
cartoon   is   notable   in   that   although  most   of   the  workers   are   depicted  with





Figure 3: ‘BCA, Stanley Franklin, The Sun ((c) News UK), 22 May 1976’.
them   as   left­wing.   Franklin's   car   workers   are   simply   lazy,   flat­capped
proletarians,   rather   than  communist   saboteurs,  a   reflection  of   the  extent   to
which the distinction between the “reasonable moderate” and the “dangerous
militant”  was becoming   less   relevant,  as   it  was   replaced by  accusations of
laziness. 
Such   ideas   formed   part   of   a   wider   narrative   about   “militant”   workforces





Britain's   economic  progress.  He  invoked  the  need  for  a  new  sense  of  co­
operation  between  managers  and  employees  in  an  attempt  to  generate
productivity,  arguing that   the British malaise resulted  from 'paying  ourselves
more  than  the value of what we produce'.204  The key  to  competitiveness was














































inflation  as  central   to   the  very  democratic  life  of  the  country   in  1974.  The
combination  of  economic  instability,  disorder  in  the  workplace  and  in  the
streets,  the  power  of  the  trade  unions  to  resist  government  policy,  and  the
imagery  of  union members  bullying  the  public  both  directly  and  indirectly,  all
contributed to the perception of crisis. 
Conclusion
As   the   1970s   progressed,   the   space   within   which   car   workers,   and   their
counterparts  in other unions, could conduct “legitimate collective bargaining”
contracted,  as  the nation's worries over  rising prices and  falling productivity
were collectively placed on the shoulders of all trade union members, whether
militant or moderate. By  the end of the 1970s  public  discourse  on  the  trade
unions  had  changed  substantially.  Whereas  the  narratives  of  the  1960s had
revolved  around  the  division   of  trade  union  practices  into  norms  and
pathologies,   many   now   doubted   that  any  normative,  “responsible”  trade
unionism really existed. The distinction between ordinary collective bargaining
and  political  extremism had  in many ways  broken down,  as  incomes policies
and  industrial  relations  reform  projects  blurred  the  lines  between  the  political
and   the   industrial.  As  labour  militancy  became  more  official,  embracing  an
increasing  number  of  major  disputes,  the  distinction  between  legitimate
procedural  trade  unionism and  illegitimate  unofficial  strikes  also  disappeared,











post­war  settlement ­  that  collective bargaining was  the  best way  to maintain
fairness  in  industry – only a minority of those polled in  the aftermath  of  the
Winter  of  Discontent  considered  trade  unions  a  good  thing.211  Workers  who









bailout   of   Chrysler   UK   had   contributed   to   accusations   that   bad   industrial
relations were leading to low productivity and profitability, and, whilst the power
of   the  mineworkers  often   inspired   fear  and admiration   in  equal  measure,212
collective   action   in   the  motor   industry   rarely   evoked  much   sympathy.   The




wider  population  can  partially  be  seen  in  the  responses  given  in  public  polls









ratings  seems modest  and may  reflect  only  the  loss  of  those whose  support
was in any case conditional on the less combative style of the immediate post­
war  era.  Class  position  and  previous  experience  of  industrial  action  also
produced markedly  different  attitudes,  with  working­class  respondents  to  one
survey being more likely to know of strikes they believed to be correct, and less
likely to worry about “excessive” union power.215
Nevertheless, even amongst  trade unionists, we can still  find evidence of  the
effects  of   “union  bashing”.  A poll  in October  1975  found  two  thirds of union
members  thought  that  their movement  had  too much power, and as many as
one third saw it as the main problem confronting the nation.216 Even allowing for
the  possibility  that  such  results might  be  produced  by  the  survey  format,  the
context  in  which  questions  were   posed  and  the  possibility  of  respondents
producing  “correct”  answers, we have  to account  for  the paradoxical  fact  that
many  workers must  have  both  adhered  to  the  dominant  discourse  on  “trade
















motivate  less  committed  workers  to  participate  in  collective  action  often
reflected the ways in which they came to terms with these contradictions. 
Narratives of disorder were a consistent context for workplace activists, and car
workers   often   found   their   actions  attacked  by   their   own   local   newspapers,
Labour politicians and  left­leaning tabloids. Yet even amidst  twenty  years  of
rising hostility significant groups continued to generate the cultures, behaviours
and  practices  which  were  deemed  pathological  by  this  dominant  discourse.
Given their reputation and the widespread condemnation of their trade union
practices, attempts to explain such behaviour in terms of the conventionality of
workers'  attitudes seems misplaced,  even  if   labour  historians have correctly
downplayed the influence of Leninism.217 However moderate car workers may
have  felt   their   industrial  activism  to be,   throughout   this  period  workers who
stepped   outside   officially­prescribed   norms   for   behaviour   were   seen   as
transgressive   and   potentially   damaging   to   the   nation.   Acknowledging   this,
rather   than   pretending   that   a   form   of   “reasonable”   trade   unionism
predominated,  is an  important step  in coming to understand this period and
enables us to ask key questions. Why did workers, ostensibly untouched by
radical ideas, come to engage in these sorts of collective behaviours? Why did














As   Les  Kealey,   a   national   official   of   the  TGWU,   put   it:   'a   number   of   our
stewards have got into the habit of trying to solve their own problems'.218 Kealey
was discussing   the  growing  tendency of  workers   to  engage  in  self­directed
“unofficial” strikes. As we have seen in Chapter Two, from the late 1950s such






primarily   to  a   “breakdown” of  obsolescent   institutions,  arguing  that   “external
bargaining”   by   employers   federations   and   national   union   officials   was
inadequate for the complex world of full  employment and Fordism.220  Similar
explanations have been offered by  labour historians,  including Chris Howell,
who   attributes   increased   industrial   conflict   from   the   1950s   onwards   to   a
structural shift in the economy. As old staple industries (coal, textiles, rail) gave
way to more Fordist forms of production the lack of adequate institutions for
managing   change   within   the   workplace   resulted   in   higher   unofficial   strike
levels.221  In this regard, Howell goes further than much of the historiography,






motor   industry   and   elsewhere.   Keith   Laybourn   and   Henry   Pelling   do   not
analyse  in  any great  depth  the emergence of  shop­floor  organisations,  with
Laybourn  speculatively  offering   'external  pressures  and  developments'  as  a
possible cause and Pelling emphasising the effects of multi­unionism.222 






standards  were  based.  Ross  McKibbin,  amongst   others,   has   talked  of   'the




This   tendency   was   echoed   in   much   of   the   commentary   around   the
phenomenon of affluence. 1950s concern over the fortunes of the Labour Party


















modern   was   contrasted   with   traditional,   working   class   with   classlessness,





qualitative   change   in   industrial   relations   took   place   in   the   1940s,  with   the
introduction  of   full  employment  and  widespread  union   recognition.  Reid,   for
instance, asserts a grand continuity, grouping the trade unionists of the 1920s
with   those   of   the   1970s,   and   personifying   much   of   post­war   engineering
activism in one AEU leader, Hugh Scanlon, who he depicts as 'squarely within

































































more   paternalistic   employer,   offering   shorter   working  weeks,   discussion   of























quickly   in   the  Coventry  motor   firms,   led  by   future  General  Secretary   Jack

























the opportunity  to rid  themselves of “troublemakers”, dismissing most of  the
wartime activists at their three Oxford factories, including the AEU Convenor at
Cowley in 1946.245  The following year when a snowstorm shut down Oxford
industry  Arthur  Exell,   then  Convenor  of  Morris  Radiators,  was  called   in  by
management   and   informed   that  workers  would   be   sent   for   individually   as









were   negotiated   outside   the   factory,   with   stewards   as   peripheral   figures,
responsible for signing up members and collecting dues. Such arrangements
were not supposed to impinge on managerial prerogatives, including the right















the   late   1950s.  At  Rootes,   factory   organisation   clung   on  only   by   resisting
attempts   to   fire  activists   in   the   immediate  post­war  period,  culminating   in  a





trade   unionism  was   peripheral   for  most   semi­skilled  workers,   and   even   in
factories  with  more  substantial  membership,  unions  still   struggled   to  assert
themselves,   dealing  with   small   numbers   of   issues   and   rarely   engaging   in
strikes,  an   indication   that   collective  action  was  a   less  pervasive   feature  of
workplace life.250   
Conditions in the post­war motor industry














final   automobile,   or   working   with   contractors   providing   other   components




inspectors,   drivers   and   storekeepers)   and   craftworkers   (toolmakers,
electricians, setters, millwrights ­who usually provided or maintained machines).
Each role  involved different pressures and constraints.  For  trackworkers  the
work content  was dictated by  the speed of  the production  line, whilst  many





and   sub­area.   The  paint   shop  might   consist   of   a   section   spraying  bodies,





Nevertheless,  we can point   to  consistencies  in  terms of  workers'   rights and
common grievances, especially amongst the non­craft majority. For instance,
although   there   is   little   to   suggest   that   car   plants   were   markedly   more










to  complain   that  his   steward  was   'failing   in  his  duties'   in  accepting  current
'intolerable   conditions'.253  Evidently   Crowe   thought   it   unlikely   management
would rectify the situation and brought the matter first to his shop steward and
later   to   a   full­time   official,   an   indication   that   he   considered   the   in­factory
organisation too weak to force an improvement. It was not just at Longbridge
where unions and firms could be slow to react. In the early 1950s, management
at Briggs preferred to  lay women munition workers off  rather  than attend to
complaints that an open door was making the shop insufferably cold.254 
Discipline was another area over which car workers usually had little control.
Motor   firms   invested   supervisors  with   unilateral   power   over   job   allocation,
overtime  and  dismissal,   and   foremen  often   subjected   their   subordinates   to
heavy­handed   or   inconsistent   discipline.   For   instance,   in   one   case   at






















wrath   was   also   incurred   by   workers   asking   for   time   off,   and   stewards
complained   of   a   number   of   arbitrary   dismissals   and   transfers.259  The
experiences of workers at Tyseley and Longbridge show that even the relatively
lax   managerial   regimes   that   supposedly   characterized   piecework260  gave
supervisors sufficient scope to create friction if ill­disposed.
Control over the work process
The work process  itself  could also create  ill­feeling.  Under piecework,  work
speed was largely dictated by the wage structure. Production workers at BMC,
Rootes  and  Standard­Triumph  (and  Vauxhall  up   to  1956)   received  a  basic
wage supplemented by a bonus calculated according to output. Although this
payment system was later seen to favour “wage drift” (wages rises in excess of
national   agreements),261  with   weak   shop­floor   organisation   management
controlled the bonus system, meaning they could use low bonuses to drive up























This  was  the case at  Longbridge  in  May 1949,  when management  tried  to
impose   reduced   rates  on   the  gearcutters,   the  section   represented  by  AEU
convenor Dick Etheridge.264 Although the action provoked conflict in this well­
organised department, elsewhere on the site rates were imposed unilaterally.



























speed of  the assembly  line. The official  agreement between the unions and
Ford  explicitly   reserved   the   right   for  management  of  determine   these  work
standards. Although worker activists would eventually win some informal rights
in  this area during the 1950s, Ford's production line was intended to run at




Their  average weekly wage  remained 33 per  cent  higher   than  the  average
manual worker, as it had been even in the 1930s.267  Yet, control over wage
levels and wage security still varied according to workplace and type of work.
As discussed above,   the  idea of piece rates was  that   they were subject   to
“scientific”   rate­fixing   not   negotiation.   Consequently,   prior   to   shop­floor
bargaining workers had little control over wages, which rose in  line with the
basic rates negotiated by national union officials. Far from “wage drift” being the

























sack   mentality'.269  Such   practices   discouraged   workers   from   fighting
redundancy, and enabled the wave of post­World War Two victimisations that
we noted earlier. The response to the Morris sackings demonstrated how little




employment and union recognition,  the company was  freely able  to dismiss
active trade unionists. The wider redundancies of which the victimisations were
part  also  seem  to  have passed  unchallenged,   indicating   the  acceptance of







James   Cronin's   contention   that   by   1950   'the   world   of   work   had   become
marginally   less   oppressive'   is   only   true   so   long   as   we   emphasise   the
marginality of   the changes.270  Factories continued to be potentially dirty and
dangerous places, with autocratic hierarchies and limited official recognition for
trade unions. Negotiation over work effort and wages was asymmetrical at best
and often  non­existent.   In   the  absence of   the  social  practices of  shop­floor
trade unionism that marked everyday life in later decades, we find the exercise





absence   of   a   collective   social   power   with   which   to   resist,   fatalism   and
acceptance were sometimes a “rational” response to the existing possibilities





piecework, with  its  less  intense patterns of  supervision,  where management


















militancy   during   the   1980s   gave   the   “privatism”   thesis   fresh   impetus   and
historians have continued to employ it in more recent histories.273 For instance,












“traditional”   with   “solidaristic”   and   “modern”   with   “individualistic”,274  makes
similar claims in Identities and Social Change in Britain Since 1940, where he
argues that  the strong sense of class felt  by many manual  workers  in mid­




working­class   affluence   and   privatism.   Lawrence   asserts   that   in   parts   of




was   …   ahistorical.'276  Lawrence's   work   re­thinks   the   legacy   of   post­war
sociology,   asserting   that   the   “privatism”   thesis   derived   from   a   refusal   to
understand prosperous workers 'on their own  terms' and a preoccupation with
ideas   of   “traditional”   working­class   communities.277  Where   Lawrence   has
disputed   the   novelty   of   post­war   “privatism”,   I   call   into   question   its   binary



















and   in   fact   car  workers   struggled   to   affect   their   pay   and   conditions.   The
development   of   their   later   social   power   –   the   capacity   to   re­shape   their
environment and impose their will on others ­ was not an inevitable effect of the
post­war   settlement   and   a   less  militant   collective   culture  with   a  more   co­
operative rationality was dominant well into the mid­1950s. As a consequence
of conditions in the industry and different social relations between the workers,










'class   conflict'   was   important   in   re­shaping   institutions,   this   is   only   really
addressed in abstract terms and the origins of said conflict are found outside





reacting   to   dysfunction   and   thereby   alerting   the   state   as   to   the   need   for
reform.279 Alan McKinlay and Joseph Melling's work on authority relations in the
British engineering industry does offer some more detailed reflections on how it


















skilled   workers   often   had   less   need   to   confront   management   to   win
concessions. Unions struggled to recruit the lowest­paid indirects (workers not








because   the  promise  of  above­average  wages  and   the   threat  of  anti­union











fighting   to  drive  up wages and  improve conditions,  most  workers   looked  to
overtime and high productivity to supplement their wages. In order to organise
their   factories,   union­minded   workers   had   to   achieve   more   than   simple
recruitment and recognition. They had to change attitudes and create “trade




acting   together.   Finally   collective   action   had   to   be   effective   enough   that
participation   became   self­evidently   beneficial   to   both   the   group   and   the
individual – “common­sensical” in the terms I discussed in the introduction. How
this  process  unfolded   is   crucial   to  understanding  workplace   life   in  post­war
Britain, both in terms of the nature of the social relations that would characterise




How   then,   did  workers   go   about   the   process   of   organising?  Despite   their
problems, worker activists could draw on a variety of common grievances to aid
recruitment.  As  noted  above   factories   could  be  dirty,   unpleasant   or  unsafe




people.   One   possible   resource   they   could   draw   on   was   the   trade   union
bureaucracy.   At   Dagenham,   the   local   AEU   officer,   Claude   Berridge,
encouraged   both  militancy   and   organisation,   and   following   the   opening   of
Halewood in 1962,  their  district  secretary, Sam Glasstone, was also heavily
involved in unionisation.283 However, such contributions were the exception and




Where  they contributed at all,  union officers  largely restricted themselves to
advising factory activists.
Most recruitment was carried out by the workers themselves, at  the factory.
Occasionally,   this   took   the   form   of   recruitment  en  masse.  At   Tyseley   the
stewards would organise gate meetings, where a senior activist would stand on



















historiography.288  Yet   the   system   that   evolved   in   the   1950s,   where   large
factories   elected   hundreds   of   stewards   to   joint   shop   stewards'   committees
[JSSCs289] representing all types of workers, was by no means an inevitable
outcome  of   post­war   industrial   relations,   and   indeed   unpaid   shop­floor   “lay
representatives”  had not  previously  been a significant   feature of  car   factory
life.290  In  earlier  periods,   the   few shop stewards  recalled  by  workers mostly





























unionisation,   using   the   steward   card   for   legitimacy   and   the   wider   factory
organisation for support. However, without the loyalty of the majority of their co­
workers, persuasiveness was the representative's only weapon and stewards
elected  in  this way might  struggle  to mobilise  their  co­workers. Such a  fate
befell  W.  Cook,   a   tool­room   steward   at   Rover   Tyseley,  who   tendered   his
resignation   in   1949,   citing   the   lack   of   support   from  his   section.293  Another
Longbridge worker,   taking similar action  in 1946, bemoaned  'the  lack of co­





























unless   you   want   this   arbitrarily   imposed   on   you,   you   needs   [sic]   to   get





This  company  has  got   a   long   record  of  anti­trade­unionism.   If   in  any











Looking at   the  process of  organising  at  shop­floor   level   further   illustrates  a
central  argument  in  this chapter,   that so­called “traditional”  habits had to be
created,   propagated   and   proven   to  work   through   forms   of   “communicative
action” of  the type discussed in the introduction. When we look at Nicholas'
account of recruiting workers we see how important voluntary action was  in





“instrumental  collectivism”  and  “economic   rationality”,   the  way he convinced
workers to join and participate in the union was not just economic. He was not
simply   persuading   his   colleagues   that   they   were   exploited,   but   was   also
convincing them that they had the right and the ability to negotiate better terms.
Furthermore,   he   was   advocating   a   particular   model   of   organising,   where
workers chose  their   representatives and owed them  their  solidarity.  Without
this, he argued, trade unionism had no purpose and ceased to exist   in any
meaningful way. 
Nicholas'   pedagogical   technique   involved   simultaneously   inculcating   four











work.   One   obvious   starting   point   was   the   grievances   discussed   above   –






glance   to   be   largely   “economistic”.   In   the   Morris   Cowley   paint   shop,













The   rapid   fulfilment   and   limited   nature   of   Fryer's   promise   is   key   to
understanding piecework's importance. Organisation over this issue was easy
because there were regular, small­scale rate adjustments to be disputed, and
concessions  could  be  won.  Even  the  most   reluctant   trade  unionist   found  it
difficult   to   argue   against   a   pay   rise,   particularly   when   victories   could   be




norms discussed  in  Chapter Two) and  involved collective bargaining on  the
smallest  possible  scale:  on a section­by­section basis.  Even  in  unorganised
shops,  workers   took  an   interest   in   rates   and   in   calculating   the   amount   of
production required in order to achieve their earnings target. With rates peculiar
to small  sections of   the workforce,  who could discuss  their  mutual   interests
during tea breaks and lunch hours, it was a small step to challenging timings
and  debating  with   rate­fixers.  Finally,  since  wage   rates  could  be compared
between different groups of workers, victories in one part of the factory served
as a stimulant to activism elsewhere.300
Non­production dayworkers were denied  this quick route  to organisation,  as
their wages were organised by factory­wide grades, necessarily  implying the
construction of larger collectivities. As a result, dayworkers often organised later
than   pieceworkers,  with   their   demands   barely   a   feature   of   shop   stewards'
meetings at Tyseley or Longbridge until the second half of the 1950s. When







of   jobs,  better  safety standards and against   'petty  discipline'.301  Similarly,  at
Longbridge,   the  first  mention of  a  strike  amongst   the day­rated marshallers
related  to  a disciplinary suspension.302  Stewards  in   these departments  were
unable to draw on the economic logic of the wage structure, so early organising
attempts   looked   to   grievances  which   (like   piece   rates)   could   be   limited   to





the   tendency,   identified   by   Todd,   for   affluence   to   largely   bypass   unskilled
workers until the 1960s.303  Pieceworker activism acted as a stimulus both by
raising   wages   and   inviting   comparisons,   and   by   providing   an   factory­wide
activist base to support the lower paid. At Longbridge, dayworker activism often






these   strikes   resulting   in  wholesale   company   shut­downs.  Crucially   for   the


















battle'.306  Under   the hourly  pay system, wage rates were a corporate  issue,
determined by national bargaining, and all other elements of the work process
were   explicitly   beyond   negotiation.   Consequently,   everyday   participation   in
small­scale   collective   bargaining   was   not   as   organic   as   under   piecework.
Although the union organisation at Dagenham emerged from World War Two









recalls   trim   shop  workers   refusing   to   continue  working  when  management
changed tack suppliers, as the new tacks apparently tasted worse, a possible












management   unilateralism,   or   confrontation   with   the   attitudes   of   more
deferential   workers.  Consequently,  workshop   conditions  made   for   relatively
easy victories in the face of a difficult employer. 






generating conflict.  One typical  incident was described to  libertarian socialist

















Firstly,   they  were  of   limited   scale,   pertaining   to  sections   rather   than  entire
factories, and thus did not depend on broad mobilisations. Secondly, they were
easily solved, with realistic, tangible strategies for their resolution. Finally, they
were   “reasonable”   demands   within   the   existing   attitudes   and   values   of
participants – forming part of everyday changes in production. Above all, their
key  feature was  that   they contributed  to  sectional  organisation,  and  implied
changes in  sectional  culture, which calls  into question the dysfunctional role
that so­called “fragmentation” often plays in labour history.311 In this organising



















When  I  got  here,  put  on  a  section,   I  asked around  for   the steward.   I
eventually found out who he was but when I went up to him he told me
that   we   couldn't   talk   about   the   union   in   the   company's   time.   The
management would object he said. So I thought, sod you. He asked me
what union I was in and I said “not yours you bastard.”312
In   this   instance,   the   steward   concerned   saw   his   role   as   defined   by   the
parameters set by Ford management. This conception of trade unionism saw















culture   amongst   the   workforce.   Despite   electing   a   steward,   and   recruiting







Longbridge   in   1950,   despite   70  per   cent  union  membership  and  over   200
stewards,   only   five   shops   were   active   enough   to   require   the   convenor's
attention more than once that year.314 
Yet these were the beginnings of a process which  could  produce a “militant”
shop culture:  one  in  which  the workers were prepared  to  act  collectively   in
defence of their pay and conditions. Following the election of a representative,
the  discussion  of  grievances  in  shop meetings began a process of  cultural
change. Often located within the workshop and taking place during break times,
section meetings enabled widespread participation and encouraged workers to
discuss  their  grievances, helping  to constitute  them as a group. Democratic
decision­making   then   converted   collective   interests   into   a   consensus   and
impressed upon representatives a democratic  mandate   to  be  fulfilled,  whilst
implicitly   promising   group   support   for   action.   This   constituted   a   mutual















rights,  derived  from  this  organisational  phase and going beyond  the   limited
“external bargaining” bequeathed by the post­war settlement. One such right





a   temporary   rate,  members   instructed  their  steward  to  pursue a  permanent
agreement. In reply, the rate­fixer submitted a list of prices equivalent to similar
operations on an older model, which was rejected. The following day, the chief
rate­fixer   for   the East  Works observed  the department but  offered no more
money.  A  discussion  ensued   in  which  steward  L.   Jeans  argued   that  other
departments enjoyed better rates. At this point, the departmental foreman Mr.
Tynes   lost   his   temper,   shouting   'you   are   not   to   talk   of   people   in   other
departments!  Until   I  make another  offer  you don't  exist!'  The stewards  then
returned to work, reporting the incident to their shop committee, who passed a












it   logically   commanded   the   same  price.   Tynes'   actions,   initially   offering   an
identical   rate   and   becoming   irritated   at   the   need   to   barter,   illustrate   the
uncertainty   of   piecework  negotiation   rights   at   this   point.   The  workers  were
attempting to establish a new bargaining custom, whereby any change in model
would   bring   negotiations   in  which   they   could   press   for   equality  with   other
sections and  look to  improve  their   living standards. The solidarity  implied  in
“backing   up”   their   shop   stewards   would   be   crucial   to   this   transition,
simultaneously diminishing the threat of victimisation and heightening the sense
that workmates could be depended upon to support collective action. Events
like  this  changed expectations on both  sides,  contributing  to  a shift   in  how
industrial relations were conducted, and workers' rights more generally.


























the   new   practice   of   aggressive   bartering   was   often   effective,   this   shifted
expectations from accurate timings to the idea that rates would be fair vis­a­vis




agreement,   taking  the  form of  written or  verbal  agreements or   just   informal
understandings.  Crucially   in   terms of  militant  shop cultures,   the actual   form
agreements   took   was   usually   less   important   than   what   the   workers   were
prepared   to   do   in   terms   of   defending   them.   Since   from   management's
perspective these “customs” were often secured under duress (as a result of
sanctions   or   the   threat   of   sanctions)   and   were   therefore   of   questionable











and   violating   the   workforce's   new   expectations.   Ernie   Stanton,   an   NUVB
steward in the Dagenham assembly plant until his dismissal for union activities,
describes   the   build­up   to   a   large   strike   in   1962   as   typical   of   this   sort   of
behaviour. The company would remove workers or speed up the line without
consultation, something that Stanton claimed 'ignored custom and practice', as
it   involved  'no  use of  procedure'  and constituted   'unilateral  management'.319
This   frequently   resulted   in  spontaneous walkouts,  based on  the  defence of
existing “fair” conditions and their right to be consulted over labour load. Yet
Ford   management   always   maintained   that   they   determined   work   effort





leave   new  worker   expectations   in   tact   and   link   them   to   collective   action,
something that encouraged future resistance. 




For management,   that   reliability  meant an  increasing number of avenues  in
which its freedom to operate was likely be challenged, an expectation which











As  this  capacity   (social  power)   to  effect  change  through cooperative  action
developed,   it   enabled   workers   to   engage   in   more   collective   action   and
challenge management in new areas of working life, gradually creating the kind
of shop cultures which later became familiar. Simultaneously, these new social




individual  sections where   full   (or  nearly   full)  membership  had been brought

















refuses   to   accept   trade  union   responsibilities.'323  The  man   in   question  had
initially joined the union then subsequently fallen behind on his subscriptions
and been expelled. When offered a final chance to rejoin, he had refused, citing
“conscientious   objections”   to  membership.324  The   strikers'   publicity  material
invoked a number of clear moral values illustrative of the workplace cultures












We recall that the  habitus  structures historical agency  through a tendency to
generate   “reasonable”,   “common­sense”,   behaviours,   whose   limits   are   set











militant   union   activism  would   get   them   the   sack.   Foremen  and   production
managers   were   more   inclined   to   impose   changes   or   allow   unpleasant
conditions to persist because experience told them that such things would not
usually   be   contested.  Moreover,   the   absence   of   certain   social   practices   ­
regular   group   meetings,   steward   election,   group   sanctions   –   promoted
rationalities   in   which   managerial   prerogative   was   a   given,   but   collective
interests   less   tangible.   Even   with   considerable   grievances   and   in   a
comparatively benign economic and political context, shop­floor social relations
promoted   an   economic   rationality   in   which   the   purpose   of   work   was   to
maximize  personal  earnings,  and a social   rationality   in  which pressure was
sometimes put on others to help secure those earnings. At its most elaborate
such rationality produced the practice already described by Vauxhall  worker







Thus expectations of   fair   treatment,   in   terms of  minimum standards  for   the
physical environment, supervisory consideration and calculation of the wage­
effort bargain, all tended toward a limited revision of shared practices, an effect

















bullied   into   anything.'   Evans   joined   but   later   escaped   by   “getting   on”   and
becoming a supervisor elsewhere in the company.329
 




new   social   practices   and   cultural   norms.  Elements   of   factory   life   including
regular   shop   meetings,   reporting   back   from   higher   levels   of   the   union,
conflictual collective bargaining and organised disruption to production became
more commonplace. As these practices became more habitual, their reliability
as   tools  made   their   use  more   common­sensical.  Workers   found   that   their
individual   and   collective   agency   gained   them   new   capacities,   encouraging












perpetuation   of   eternal   labour   movement   traditions,   and   their   appearance
should not be taken for granted. Rather  they represented the  invention and
propagation   of   new   solidarities,   social   practices,   collectivities   and   value
systems.   By   disaggregating   the   different   forms   of   power   present   in   the
workplace, separating the formal institutional role of the trade union from the
power  of   the  workers   themselves,   the  process  by  which   “organising”  came









the   influence   of   those   external   forces   like   employers,   trade   unions   and
governments   for  which  many   scholars   claim  a   central   role.  With   regard   to
governments, Chris Howell correctly sees the state as fundamental in shaping
wider British industrial relations, but in the motor industry its influence seems to







aimed at  appeasing  already  mobilised  workforces.  Scamp's   inquiry   into   the
Cowley Paint Shop in 1965, where large numbers of unofficial strikes drew the










the potential   risk  of  victimisation)   involved   in  organising,  Tolliday   too  easily
takes for granted the act of will involved in not just filling such spaces, but also
shaping them. Workers repeatedly forced employers to concede new rights and
“overfilled”   positions   offered   to   them:   imbuing   institutions   with   rights   and
meanings beyond those originally intended. As we have seen, employers' main
contribution   to   shaping   shop­floor   bargaining  was   often  merely   regularising
what some had already won through conflict. 
In   terms   of   the   union  movement   itself,   officials   during   this   period   had   an










AEU  were   hostile   to   factory   committees   that   regularly   supported   unofficial
disputes. However,  its  leadership did offer some support for victimised shop
stewards at Dagenham in both 1957 and 1962,  despite being critical  of   the
JSSC there. The TGWU and the National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB)
also   involved  themselves  in  campaigns  to  defend shop stewards.334  Further
influence  was   imparted  by   local  officials,  who  sometimes  offered  advice   to
nascent   shop   stewards'   organisations.   However,   involvement   in   everyday
activism was, as we noted above, extremely limited and provided little impetus
for organising after the spate of post­war recognition agreements.335 













Trades   Joint   Shop   Stewards   Committee   (MATJSSC).   Whilst   these












Having promoted them, CPGB activists  used combine committees  to  further
their policies. As Richard Stevens notes, the party won considerable influence
in   the   industry,   including   the   convenor's   position   at   most   of   the   largest
factories.339 Eddie Parry, a shop steward at Canley and briefly a CPGB official,
argued  that   'policies  that  we advocated at  some stage  later  on were  finally
adopted by many of   the  industries and  the  trade unions'.340  Yet,  Parry also
noted a tendency for car worker activists to shift the party toward policies more
likely to be accepted by their co­workers: 
They   [the  CPGB]  weren't   too  happy  about   the   idea  of  a  shorter
working week to retain labour because they said that it was merely
sharing the poverty, that we ought to resist the sack and at the same
















Consequently   the experiences of  each  factory and each workshop were  far
from   uniform.   As  much   as   they   were   structured   by   external   forces,   their









At  Cowley,   the main  assembly plant   for  Morris  Motors,  Lord Nuffield   (W.R.
Morris)   remained   hostile   to   trade   unionism   even   after   1945.   As   noted























than shop­floor  organisation  reflecting  the gradual   imprint  of   traditional  craft
consciousness  onto  unorganised   trackworkers,   at  Cowley   it  was   the   semi­





























materials   from,   or   destined   for,   the   strike­bound  workplace),  mass   pickets









came back  [from holiday],   they  would  not  go   into  work.'352  By   the   time  the

















size   and   visibility   of   the   dispute   meaning   workers   could   use   new   social
practices – mass meetings, mass pickets, a silent vigil – to make a symbolic
demonstration   of   a   union   that   had   heretofore   only   existed   as   individual
recruiters. It reproduced the solidarity implied by those union cards in physical
form, forcing waverers to confront it, provoking a moral response and stating its











create greater  organisational  capacity  which  led activists   to  embark upon a
campaign   for  100  per  cent   trade  unionism,  with  activists  using   the  spaces
opened up by the strike to re­make the culture of the factory from the bottom
up. 













































factory   closed   shop  was  agreed,361  marking   the   culmination  of   a   stop­start












1960s,   rights   were   generalised   across   the   plant,   partially   overcoming   the
unevenness that marked these developments. Thus just as at sectional level,
workers took the spaces offered to them, often “by omission”, and “over­filled”








This   pattern   of   overcoming   management   hostility   through   the   gradual
development   of   shop­floor   organisations   was   repeated   in   other   firms,   but
elsewhere, sometimes even in neighbouring factories, experiences varied. At
two connected Dagenham firms, Briggs and Ford, industrial relations developed











the  Briggs stewards  found  it  easier   to  make advances prior   to   the merger.
Briggs'   piecework   arrangements   allowed   stewards   to   build   up   strength









MDW Ford   set  wage   rates   in   national   negotiations,  and   jealously  guarded





raised   its   own   finance,   employed   a   full­time   secretary,   issued   its   own
propaganda   and   published   its   own   newspaper   –  The   Voice   of   Briggs
Workers'.368 The stewards organisation ensured a regular flow of  information
with JSSC meetings every Wednesday and “report back” shop meetings every
Thursday,   in   which   workers   ratified   decisions   taken   the   previous   day.369
Through   tight   organisation   workers   secured   substantial   control   over   job
standards, labour mobility, over­time, and relief times.370 After the takeover, the
Briggs stewards attempted to retain their practices and conditions and to create


















lessen   the   day­to­day   conflict,   or   reduce   the   number   of   stoppages'.372
Consequently,   in   1957   Ford   renewed   its   offensive   against   the  Dagenham
JSSC,   dismissing   steward   John   McLoughlin   over   an   attempt   to   call   an
unauthorised  meeting.  The  strike   to  secure  his   reinstatement  was  declared
official by the AEU, who eventually ended the strike in exchange for a court of
inquiry (see Chapter Two).373 Conflict continued after the opening of the new
assembly   plant   in   1958.   Despite   Ford   trying   to   instil   strict   discipline,   with
substantial numbers of former Briggs workers accustomed to more consultative
arrangements the plant's teething problems allowed more militant stewards to
reassert   old   practices.374  Arguments   ensued   about   stewards   and   meeting
rights, health and safety, manning and overtime, and the new plant became the
most strike­prone part of Dagenham.375 
Subsequently,  Ford  workers  gained considerable  notoriety,  with  even minor
disputes   becoming   national   news.   In   1961,   an   argument   over   a   national
agreement   to   remove   the   afternoon   tea   break   prompted   Liberal   leader   Jo
Grimond to characterise Dagenham as a place 'where you cannot even wheel
round a tea trolley without having a row.376 The dispute itself was an unofficial


















the   day   that   wasn't   dehumanising;   'For   10   minutes   the   workers   became









The  old   need   for   unbridled  militancy   rapidly   diminished  with   the
reduction  of   our   immediate  major   social  and   industrial   problems.
One still finds pockets of militancy which are inspired by motives that
cannot   be   accepted   as   being   based   purely   on   trade   union
principles.'380 
The JSSC  faced  increasing  pressure   to  conform  to  normative  standards of
trade   unionism   and   in   1962   the   militants   in   the   assembly   plant   found
themselves fighting management attacks on their organisation. On 17 October









raise output,  and  the mix of models meant  that  changes  to   line speed and
working   practices   were   relatively   common.   If   these   were   problematic,   for
management and union officials the ideal was that workers would accept new
arrangements,   whilst   their   steward   took   the   case   through   Ford's   lengthy





Strong support   for  Francis   (only  6 voted against   the strike  in   the assembly
plant)  meant   that   a   walkout   was   inevitable,   and   whilst   official   recognition
exposed the union to criticism and liability for strike pay, it also handed them
control  of  negotiations. Whilst  at  a mass meeting on 23 October a  full­time
official backed continuation of the strike to a mass meeting of 6,000 workers,
two days  later  trade union officials,  with  assurances  from management  that
Francis' case would be looked at, advocated a return to work and convinced
the senior stewards to do likewise at a mass meeting.383 




























up   the   sort   of   relationships  with   the  Ford  Motor  Company  which  will
enable the unions to obtain for their members the best wages and working
conditions.389





























cultures   and   their   precariousness   even   into   the   1960s.   Although   wartime









developed   very   different   expectations   around   line   speed,   labour   load   and
working conditions. Finally,  the effects of  the company's repression of those
social practices in 1962 illustrates both their importance in terms of the workers'
collective   social   power   and   their   potential   fragility.   New   workplace   rights
emerged  through  voluntary  activism and often   remained dependent  upon  it






encouraged  it.  With  the backing of  the government as a so­called “national
champion”395, after the war Standard immediately launched a new model – The
Vanguard   –   and   adopted   a   high   output   strategy.396  To   obtain   this   rise   in
production, Standard organised piecework by “gang”, leaving gang leaders and
shop   stewards   to   organise   production.   These   gangs   earned   such   large
bonuses that the factory earned the reputation ­ even in the prosperous city of
Coventry ­ as “The Klondyke”.397 
The   company   used   stewards   to   maintain   output   levels,   refraining   from
challenging their credentials in the same way as elsewhere.398 With the gang











In   this   situation,   the   general   tendency   under   piecework   for   conflict   to   be











themselves   part   of   a   tradition   of   work   that   was   pervasive   across   their


















pride that made you get  it right..  Nobody wanted to  look like a silly arse by
scrapping the whole lot.'404 
Not everyone was so enamoured with the system, Alf Brogan saw at Standard
a   tendency   to  delimit  autonomy and  self­respect  by  gang;   'although   it  was
union, it was all different empires. It weren't like I always thought the union was,
you   know,   all   brothers   together.'405  Moreover,   under   gang   piecework
arrangements,   earnings   depended   not   just   on   working   fast,   but   also   on





the   fellow next   to   you,  you  could  substitute  him.'407  Stewards  and   foremen
would agree on lists of redundancies, sometimes including any workers they
found troublesome; 'He [the foreman] would make his initial selection, and then
there would be all  sorts of  trouble and ejections,  until,   finally,  after a  lot  of




steward   rights,   conceded   from   above,   could   compromise   the   autonomy  of














management  permission   to   leave  their  section.  That  December,   in  order   to
establish   the  principle   that  management   had   'the   right   to  manage   its   own
factories',   stewards   Gordon   Wright   and   Danny   Morgan   were   sacked   for
breaking  the new rules.410  In  the department  they represented,  200 workers






“commission”,   workers   found   it   necessary   to   defend   their   autonomy.   The
reaction to attacks on their custom and practice implies that a process of “over­
filling”   these   spaces   had   taken   place,   and   the   same   shop   cultures   that
produced conflict elsewhere could still be found. In part, such behaviour could
















such   tendencies  were  overcome  by   the  precarity   of   their   position,  working
alongside their constituents and remaining in post only so long as their fellow
workers declined to force them out. The refusal by stewards in 1956 to provide






Although   it   generated   consent   for   production,   gang   piecework   also  made
consensual  change part  of   factory  life.  This  form of “co­management”  could
actively create the social practices and “custom and practice” which constituted
a collective factory culture, ready to be utilised when management decided on a
more confrontational   form of  industrial   relations.  Two years  later,  during the
1956 down­turn,  management's  attempt   to  dismiss  2,500 workers,   including
substantial numbers of stewards, resulted in a major strike, which marked a
further deterioration in Standard's previously peaceful industrial relations.415 The
solidarity   displayed  on   that   occasion   showed   the   strength   of   the  Standard






















Vauxhall   instituted   a   permanent   committee   of   worker   representatives,   the
Management Advisory Committee [MAC], consisting of 20 delegates elected by
secret ballot once every three years. Some accounts emphasise the extent to






















at   Vauxhall  went   no   further   than   it   theoretically   did   at   Ford.  Management
retained control over the work process, transfers and redundancy. The issues
dealt with by the MAC were also similar to those discussed by Joint Production
Committees   at   Longbridge   and  Cowley.419  What  marked   out   the   Vauxhall
regime   was   the   ability   to   perpetuate   co­operative   workshop   cultures   and
industrial relations rationalities longer than their competitors, through a mixture
of subtle repression, astute concession and a fortunate change of direction over
wage structure,  all  of  which worked against   the development  of  adversarial
industrial relations at sectional level. 















MAC elections dropped to a  tiny 5 per cent.  Meanwhile,  union membership
levels   fell   to   just   53   per   cent,   as   both  MAC  members   and   AEU   officials
collaborated   in   bypassing   stewards   and   excluding   workers   from   decision­
making.423
On top of this unpromising  habitus,  Vauxhall  was assiduous in discouraging
shop­level   organising.   Those   stewards   that   did   come   forward  were   tightly
controlled,   and   “troublemakers”   were   often   moved   around   the   factory,





the   gradual   and   systematic   breaking   up   of   the   pressure   groups
within our more militant departments.425 









could   be   unilaterally   moved   between   sections.426  At   Vauxhall,   stewards
struggled to build a solid base in a shop before being moved, and even if they
succeeded, management restrictions on leaving their post or holding meetings
on   site  made   organising   yet  more   difficult,   particularly  when   union­minded
workers with grievances were offered a legitimate outlet via the MAC. 
In   addition   to   complaining   about   management   and   “sell­out”   committee
members,  militants   linked   to  Solidarity  were   scathing  of  many   of   their   co­
workers.   One   shop   steward   recalled   a   dispute   in   which   a   large   puddle
appeared   in   one   workshop.   Workers   continued   to   paddle   around   in   it,
'whinging', for an hour and a half. When their shop steward arrived and finally
got   it  cleared up one  turned round and  told  him,  'about  bloody  time!'  This,
claimed  the  steward,  was  representative  of   the  culture  at  Vauxhall  –   'shop
stewards are often blamed for not doing their jobs by workers who will not lift a
finger   to  help   themselves'.427  In   this  militant's  eyes  where  workers   in  other





continued,  with  the JSSC with  the Senior Stewards  functioning  largely as a
transmission   belt   for   agreements   worked   out   between   officials   and










institutions   is   difficult.  Whilst   it   is   tempting   to   attribute   Vauxhall's   uniquely
tranquil industrial relations to the impact of the MAC, clearly a number of factors
stymied  the  processes  that  produced more  militant   trade unionism at  other
factories.  Unpicking   the   varying  contributions  of  management,  activists  and
members   to   this   state   of   affairs   is   difficult.   As   the   example   of   Standard
illustrates,   co­operative   industrial   relations   did   not   necessarily   produce
clientelism, and worker representatives and members did not always accept
that institutions should function as management intended. 
Whilst   we   can   point   to   a   number   of   contextual   factors   that   discouraged
workplace   conflict   at   Vauxhall   Luton,   the   perpetuation   of   less   strike­prone
cultures there undoubtedly also derived from the choices made by activist and
non­activist workers there. The decision by factory union leaders to work within
the  MAC   structure   and   later   to   develop   strong   relationships  with   full­time






Vauxhall's  more peaceful   industrial   relations   record   reflected many workers'
perception that their employer was fairer than others, as stated by 73 per cent
of interviewees.430  When asked to reflect on the firm's record of peaceful labour

















that   the   factory   drew  employees   from  all   over  Britain   points   to   something
else.433 Militancy was a feature of workplace culture which had to be actively
constructed by worker activists, and broadly accepted by the wider workforce in
order   to   come   into  existence.  Despite  similar  economic  circumstances  and
industrial   relations   procedures,   up   until   the   mid­1960s   Vauxhall   workers
evidently chose not to generate the same social practices and engage in the
same collective behaviour as their counterparts elsewhere. That motor industry
“militancy”  was   not   universal   further   emphasises   the   importance   of  worker
agency within these social processes.
Conclusion








practices,   from which   they  derived new social  power  and   rights  and which
substantially   changed   the   nature   of  workplace   life   and   its   social   relations.
These changes were the basis for what industrial relations scholars refer to as
“the  second system of   industrial   relations”.434  Whilst   the  social  and political
context  beyond   the   factory  was  clearly   important   to   the  emergence  of   this
system,   the  agency  of  worker  activists  was  also   crucial.  Without   the   time­
consuming and risky endeavours of large number of car workers, the world of
shop   steward   committees   and   shop­floor   bargaining   could   never   have
emerged. Consequently, accounts of post­war workplace conflict that depend
solely on economic motivation or  industrial   relations regimes as explanatory
factors,  and  that overlook  the dynamic element of  worker agency,  can only







operation of   their  pragmatic   reasoning.  These developments,  with  their  new
values of interdependence and solidarity, add force to Mike Savage's critique of
post­war   binaries,  where   traditional   values,   solidarity   and   collectivism  were








committees,   trade   unions,   firms   and   the   state,   the   divergent   historical
experiences of different factories suggest there was no one way of being a car
factory trade unionist. These variations, which I will explore further in Chapter
Four,   can  only   be  understood  with   reference   to   the  underlying  process  of
sectional  organisation   I  have outlined  in   the  first  part  of   this  chapter.  Their
emergence shows that the unofficial militancy which marked the 1960s was not
an inevitable outcome of full employment and the post­war settlement, or the
uncomplicated   effect   of   changing   industrial   relations   institutions.   Those
factories where worker activists developed substantial power on the shop floor
had to break with industrial relations as understood by their employers and by





activities   of   car   workers   themselves.   Employees   were   able   to   re­make
workplace life during this period, developing the capacity to create the sort of
collective   social   power   that   can   only   be   understood   through   analysis   of
communicative action. Changing cultures, values and social practices were just
as  crucial   as  economic  motivations  and   labour  movement   traditions   to   the
militancy that developed in later decades. These changes, driven forward by





















As  we   saw   in   Chapter   Two,  much   discussion   of   this   changing   behaviour
revolved around its supposed dysfunctionality. In the context of more general
concerns   about   national   decline,   public   discourse   tended   to   consider   the
industrial strength of car workers and their “over­mighty” unions mostly in terms
of the negative effects it was presumed to have on the economy, a tendency
that   intensified   as   commentators   looked   to   place   blame   for   the   industry's
increasingly uncompetitive position  in  the global car market.  “Self­interested”








holds   unconstrained   union   militancy   responsible   for   national   economic
problems and the decline of the motor industry  is reproduced in the work of
Brian Harrison, as well as by David Childs and John Turner. Turner's account is
typical   in  attributing  the  failure of  British attempts  at  corporatism to a  trade
union movement that was too fragmented, plagued by multi­unionism and too
attached   to   free   collective  bargaining.438  The   charges  are   repeated   ­   albeit
sometimes  with   acknowledgement   of  management's   contribution   ­   in  most
economic   histories   of   the  motor   industry,   as  writers   like  Roy  Church,   Tim
Whisler   and   Peter   Dunnett   searched   for   reasons   for   the   eventual
disappearance of British­owned firms.439 
Conversely,  as I  noted  in my  introduction, many  labour historians, generally
treating their subject with greater sympathy, have preferred to counter these
charges   by   stressing   how   conflict   reflected   conventional   and   legitimate
industrial issues. Certainly the period from 1965 to 1979 provided workers with
plentiful  casus   belli,   particularly   when   the   ever   rising   cost   of   living   was
politicised by incomes policies and industrial relations reforms.440 From the early
1960s onwards, car workers in particular were also confronted by a growing
conviction   amongst   companies  and   governments   that   the   industry   required
substantial reform and rationalisation to be globally competitive. To this end, the
first  Wilson government encouraged  industrial  consolidation, promoting BMC
takeovers of Pressed Steel in 1965 and Jaguar in 1966, the Leyland­Triumph
absorption of Rover in 1967, and finally the formation of British Leyland [BL]
with a merger of all   those companies in 1968.441  Industrial restructuring was











attendant  decentralised wage bargaining,  and  introducing more  formal wage
negotiations   and   grievance   procedures.442  Through   this,   they   hoped   to   cut








even   Ford   workers   found   themselves   intermittently   threatened   with
disinvestment, as management threatened to move work to Spain, Germany
and Belgium in their attempts to raise productivity and hold down pay. 444 When
added   to   long­standing   grievances   over  wage   and   job   security,   life   in   the
industry thus offered both chronic and episodic problems for car workers.
As a corrective to  the popular narrative of the period, a sober evaluation of
workers'   very   real   economic   issues   is   necessary.  Yet,  whatever  motivation
inflation,  incomes policies,  industrial  relations acts and efficiency drives may
have provided, they were never uncomplicated causes of conflict and William
Sewell is right to caution that labour historians are often 'too easily satisfied by













mobilisation   took.   In   attributing   a   greater   share   of   the   blame   for   the
dysfunctionality  of   industrial   relations  to governments and employers,  labour
historians have often neglected the positive preferences of workers for certain
types of disruption. Reid, for instance, stresses the extent to which government
incomes   policies   were   responsible   for   the   emergence   of   the   “fragmented”




operated   is   conspicuously   absent.   Historians   have   been   happy   to   draw
attention to issues like “fragmentation”, and its various accompanying themes of
multi­unionism, demarcation and differentials, but have been reluctant to spell


























and  empowerment,   in  which  workers   involved   themselves   in   new   forms  of
collective mobilisation and decision­making.   
The second section  will   look at   the  so­called  “high   tide”  of   labour  militancy
between 1968 and 1975, analysing the different ways in which car workers and
their factory organisations reacted to a changing economic and political climate.
Responding   to   the   considerable   social   power   that  workers   had   developed
through   sectional   shop­floor   activism,   both   the   state   and   capital   looked   to
reshape labour relations, introducing more formalised agreements as a means
of   reducing  conflict   and   improving  productivity.  Consequently  workers  often
found themselves confronting new policies at  factory, company and national










As we saw  in  Chapter  Three,  during   the  1950s workers'   social  power  was
largely constructed on the basis of everyday bargaining at sectional level over
working conditions, discipline, wages and effort. The general pattern of social
organisation  in  the mid­1960s reflected this historical  process, particularly  in
terms of the capacity of workgroups to bargain independently. Often the product
of   autonomous   acts   of   creation,   workshop   organisations   maintained   a
substantial   degree   of   independence.   Although   fragmentation   by   craft   and
department ­ “sectionalism” ­ has often been treated as a “breakdown” in unity,





much   a   product   of   workers'   invention   as   they   were   industrial   relations
institutions, it appears that sectionalism was not without its advantages. 




piecework   bargaining   in   particular   offered   workers   regular   opportunities   to
negotiate and improve wages, especially at places like Longbridge, where the






































During  this  period,  non­pieceworkers had also become regularly   involved  in






we   do,   as   the   type   of   work   we   do   is   of   a   superior   grade   to
departments getting in excess of four pounds per week more than








on   the   average   earnings   of   pieceworkers,   were   becoming   increasingly
ambitious, with marshallers, cleaners and labourers demanding up to 75 per
cent   of   the   piecework   bonus   on   top   of   their   basic  wage   rates,   and   some
material handlers even asking for parity with production workers.456 











working hours.458  Wage militancy however,  was  limited by the constraints of
national bargaining and the  limits of  trade union organisation, with  industrial



























to  unilateral  managerial  discipline.  The old   right  of  supervisors   to  arbitrarily
dismiss workers had almost  entirely  disappeared by the 1960s,  increasingly
replaced by formal disciplinary procedures which management were forced to
operate  in  good  faith.  According  to Eddie Roberts,  a paint  shop steward at






workers   even   raising   active   demands   that   supervisors   better   serve   their
supposed subordinates. In one case, in October 1967, the steward for a group
of Longbridge crankshaft machinists complained that:
The supervision in No.5 [his shop] are not at all   interested  in the
safety   and   welfare   of   the   personnel   in   our   shop...   On   several
occasions we have brought the Senior Superintendent (W. Tranter)















and   discipline,   but   also   a   wide   array   of   other   issues.   At   Rootes'   Stoke
Aldermoor   Plant   in   1967   wages  made   up   just   15   per   cent  of   all   issues
discussed on the JSSC, with stewards spending the rest of time debating hours
and  job  security   (26  per  cent),  casework  pertaining   to   individuals  and  their
rights  (4 per cent),  union democracy and organisation (28 per  cent),   issues
external to the factory (10 per cent) and working conditions (13 per cent).465
Sections brought to these meetings issues ranging from complaints over union
rights,   lay­offs,   transfers,   line   speed,   demarcation   and   overtime,   to   less
conventional   issues   like   the   provision   of   a   “rehabilitation   department”   for
workers currently unfit for production.466 In other meetings, stewards brought up
disputes relating to management neglect of ill workers, accident prevention and
factory  cleanliness.467  With   its   intense  focus on  the  nature  of  everyday   life,














This   advantage   is   usually   obscured   in  most   versions   of   the   fragmentation




The  management   tended   to   say,   “This   is   as  much   as   we   can
possibly afford. We cannot afford any more. The vehicle won't be
economic  if  we pay what  you are  asking   for.”  The shop steward
would say, “The blokes won't stand for that and will walk out.” The
steward would report  back  to  the blokes. They would say bugger
this, put  their coats on and walk off  home, usually an hour or so
before knocking off time, then come back in the next morning and
















Dick  Etheridge's  daily  working  notes  are  a   testament   to   this   kind  of   social
practice, with the Longbridge convenor spending most of his time during the
late  1960s  on  precisely   these  sorts   of  negotiations.  One  meeting   involving
Etheridge,   management   and   three   stewards   from   the   Finishing   Line   in
Longbridge's  Trentham Building   in  1967 was  fairly   typical.  Brother  Fuller,  a
steward   for  a  group of   trackworkers,  did  most  of   the   talking,  haggling  with
management   over   a   new   price   for   fitting   headlights.   Fuller   informed
management   of   his   mandate   (to   settle   for   a   9s   basic   hourly   rate),   and









on  a  daily   basis,   and  also  appear   to   have  been  a   feature  of   organisation
elsewhere.470  Stewards  seldom decided   to  accept  management  offers  on  a
unilateral basis. Indeed, in a sample of 25 disputes attended by Etheridge in
1968, only once did the stewards do so, generally deciding to report back to










dismisses   these   practices   as   'primitive   direct   democracy',472  through   them,
groups  of  workers   could   formulate  demands  over   a  wide   range  of   issues,
retaining substantial control over the way negotiations unfolded. Crucially, such
meetings   were   usually   small   enough   to   allow  widespread   participation.   In
contrast   to   the  mass meetings  that  would  become more  common  later  on,
constituencies  of   around   40  members  enabled  most  workers   to   engage   in





Although   trade   unionism   in   this   period   is   often   seen   as   being   about   the
exclusivity   of   demarcated   workgroups,   the   sectional   form   that   shop­floor
bargaining took delivered considerable benefits to many “ordinary” car workers,
establishing control and autonomy for the work group, and often enabling a high
degree of  democratic  participation.  Moreover,  shop­floor  bargaining  had  the
side   effect   of   allowing   more   marginal   groups   to   make   some   unlikely
interventions of their own, most obviously, those workers with  fringe political
ideas, who were generally excluded from positions of authority elsewhere in
British   life.  Having   looked   in   greater   detail   at   the   origins   and  operation  of
sectional   bargaining,   we   can   better   comprehend   how   direct,   small­scale
workshop democracy could encourage a level of political  pluralism generally





















The Communists were not  the only beneficiaries of  this  tendency. Sectional
bargaining enabled all sorts of workers with non­mainstream left­wing ideals to




“The United Car Worker”,   which proclaimed in  its strap­line the need for  'a
































Sectionalism   could   also   benefit   other   groups   conventionally   excluded   from
social power. Lynam's organising at Longbridge reflected the initial stages of
what  would  become a   long­running  fight  against   racial  discrimination   in   the
motor   industry,   where   access   to   the   best­paying   jobs   had   often   been
monopolised through social networks run by stewards or foremen. Organised
largely along kinship­lines, these restricted many jobs to those with personal













refers   to   as   “racialized   outsiders”   to   act   as   a   “leavening   agent”,   enabling
challenges to workplace racism. As I noted in the previous chapter, sectional
activism   gradually   extended   to   all   groups   of   car   workers,   including   the
indirects.485 One consequence of this, as weaker groups gradually discovered
their   capacity   to   use   industrial   action   and   pay   comparisons   to   demand
























1.   That   a   system  of   upgrading  be   instituted,   based   on  a   list   of
vacancies at the Longbridge works,  in order that semi­skilled jobs
can be filled by labourers already employed by the company.









in   the   late   1960s   and   1970s.489  Thus,   although   sectionalism   subsequently
acquired   a   reputation   for   being   largely   about   the   defence   of   existing
privileges,490  it   did   at   times   open   up   spaces   for   groups   to   challenge
discrimination. 
If   this   anti­racist   activism   went   largely   unseen,   the   struggles   of   another

















recalled,   'Well,   it's   not   something   that  we   didn't   know   about,   really,   is   it?





fitters   and   inspectors.493  The   Dagenham   women,   like   their   counterparts
elsewhere,494  had   long   been   involved   with   trade   unionism,   having   been
instrumental   to  militancy during   the 1940s and 1950s.495  Indeed,  during   the
1962  assembly  plant  strike   (see  Chapter  Three),   the  London   region  NUVB
singled out the sewing machinists to praise their high levels of union loyalty.496
The 1968 strike was also organised  through a key social  practice of  1960s
trade unionism ­ shop meetings conducted by their stewards, Rose Boland and
Lil O'Callaghan.497 Once the strike had begun, and even after it had finished,























The   Dagenham   sewing   machinists'   dispute   had   many   special   features   –
particularly the media attention and the solidarity felt by the women themselves
­   but   in   some   ways   the   women's   actions   were   enabled   by   the   more
commonplace social practices of 1960s trade unionism, showing the power of






unions   as   for   the   company,   the  most   obvious   of  which  was   the   expense.











increased   earnings   over   time,   workers   still   suffered   considerable   privation
during disputes.
Sectional  disputes  also  affected  non­striking  co­workers.  As  a   result   of   the
Dagenham sewing machinists strike, Ford's storage facilities rapidly began to
fill with unfinished cars and within a week the company was threatening to lay
off   thousands   of   workers.501  Autonomy   for   one's   own   group   also   meant
autonomy for everyone else and since car factory production was inherently
vulnerable to disruption by small groups, non­striking car workers frequently lost
work.  In   order   to   mitigate   such   effects,   shop   and   factory   organisations
developed social practices and cultural norms for determining when industrial
action was legitimate. These practices principally consisted of either stewards
or   managers   calling   upon   factory   leaders   to   mediate   in   negotiations   and
determine the justice of the workers' case. Dick Etheridge's papers are littered
with small  notes requesting his presence at  different  negotiations.  Figure 4,
depicting a request  from management  to respond to a strike, and  Figure 5,
where a steward asks Etheridge to address the 'restless' members of the West
Works, are wholly typical.
The   rationale   by   which   factory   convenors   defined  which   grievances   were
501 Friedman and Meredeen, The Dynamics of Industrial Conflict, p. 92.
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Figure 5: MSS.202/S/J/3/2/69, August 
1969.
Figure 4: MSS.202/S/J/3/2/68, May 1969.
“legitimate”   shifted   according   to   a   changing   communicatively­determined
consensus, whilst sustaining some general determining values over a longer
period.   Reflective   of   many   of   the   ideas   discussed   in   Etheridge's   “Austin







workforces,   including  the supporters of   libertarian socialist   journal  Solidarity,
who were usually keen to celebrate what they saw as “workers' power”. 502 This
idea   remained   important  long   after   sectional   bargaining   ended   and  was   a
feature of worker discourse into the 1970s and beyond.503 
Such norms were used  to  control  sectional  activism and helped  to  strike a
balance between group autonomy and wider   interests,   reinforcing   the basic
ideas of trade unionism as factory leaders saw them. However, they were rarely
used  to   force groups  to  abandon action.  Short  of  actually   replacing striking
workers (a total contravention of trade union values prohibiting strikebreaking),
there   was   often   little   that   weak   central   institutions   could   do   to   control
determined  workgroups.   Throughout   the  mid­1960s   the   senior   stewards   at
Stoke Aldermoor were frustrated by their inability to control sectional militancy,
with AEU convenor Ray Wild at one point pleading with track workers to 'keep
their   feet   on   the   ground'   and   reminding   them   of   the   proper   channels   for














Because  sectional  bargaining  derived   its   legitimacy   from  intensely  personal
democratic practices, people who refused to abide by majority decisions were
often subjected to bullying and intimidation – a feature of various motor industry




fine   to  charity  and abide by  majority  decisions  in   the   future.  Beyond  these
sparse details  a  clear  explanation  of  events   is  difficult   to  discern.  Although
investigations by the TGWU and AEU found no evidence of intimidation, the
political   importance  of   the   case  gave  both  unions  a  motivation   to  clear  all












“militants”,   adherence   to   union   decisions   seldom   had   to   be   enforced   by




















Alongside   the   constraints   on   individuals,   shop   organisation   also   imposed
limitations  on what  workers  could  achieve with   their  activism.  For   instance,
Henry   Friedman's   account   of   the   Dagenham   strike   makes   it   clear   how






interventions  to  secure support   from Halewood,  and speaking at   the NUVB
annual   conference.509  Whilst   sectional   activism   provided   opportunities   to
discuss   and   decide   collectively,   debates   were   often   framed   by   stewards.
Dependence on  the quality  of  individual  activists  seems  to have been  fairly
widespread   and   no   doubt   contributed   to   the   tendency   for  militancy   to   be
concentrated   only   temporarily   and   in   particular   sections,510  with   effective
collective   action   often   restricted   to   those   shops   which   happened   to   have
assertive stewards. Consequently, participation in wider debates on workplace
life   was   often   mediated   and   in   the   absence   of   a   strong   factory­wide
organisation, ineffective stewards and weakly organised shops were frequently
left to their own devices.511 
Dependence   on   stewards   was   not   the   only   limitation   imposed   by
decentralisation.   Although   sectionalism   had   helped   the   sewing   machinists
organise,   their  strike went well  beyond  the conventional  constraints  of shop
organisation, touching on labour relations policies on an industrial and national
scale, overtly politicising the issues at stake and forcing the unions, Ford and






















unable   to  make   significant   progress   under   shop   bargaining.  Workers  who
controlled   basic   conditions   at   shop   level   were   ill­disposed   toward   costly
industrial  action over  what   they often perceived  to  be  fringe  issues.  Almost
every year, the union's national officers presented Ford with a comprehensive
lists of demands, including rights to pensions, training, redundancy pay, holiday
entitlements   and   reduced  hours,  which  were  usually   sidelined   in   favour   of
straight pay demands.   In the 1968 CSEU strike mentioned above the Austin
JSSC leaflet focused solely on the 15 per cent wage increase, mentioning no


















means   by   which   to   build   broader   social   connections.518  Low   member
participation in forums orientated toward the wider union further exacerbated
the problem. The Affluent Worker noted that just 4 per cent of the workers they





commentators   to   imply   that   shop   stewards'   committees   wielded   tyrannical





had an  intermittent role  in  the second half of   the 1960s, only meeting on a
quarterly   basis,   attracting   relatively   few  stewards,   and  even   cancelling   two
inquorate  meetings   in   1968.521  Similar   problems   occurred   at   Stoke,  where
average attendance for their JSSC meetings was just 60 in 1966 (less than half


















a JSSC vote  in May 1965,   leaving around 600 sections unrepresented and
unable to influence events on a factory­wide basis.523 Those sections, could, in
theory, have replaced the existing steward with a more assiduous character,
but   the   JSSC as  a   body  would   still   have   lacked   influence.  Moreover,   if   a
steward   did   a   good   job   on   their   section   but   was   inactive   in   wider   union
business, it was unlikely that members would be motivated to replace them. As
a   result,  worker­influence  over  wider   issues  and  decision­making  at   factory
level was at best indirect and at worst virtually non­existent. 
The scope of sectional discussion
With   the   locus   of   solidarity   lying   with   workgroups   rather   than   the   factory
workforce  as  a  whole,   issues outside  everyday concerns  like  pensions and
holidays were either sidelined or dealt with by a small clique of senior activists.
At  Stoke   for   instance,   the  stewards  didn't   begin  discussing   the  need   for  a
pension scheme until 1970, when a special sub­committee was established to
investigate,   those  responsible  would not   report   for  a   further   two years,  and
ordinary  members  appear   to   have  had   little   involvement   in   the  process.524






were equally  outside   the members'   frame of   reference,  as was state policy
toward   the   motor   industry.   Moreover,   with   workers   focused   on   sectional




across   different   areas,   making   the   connections   between   the   works   and
particular neighbourhoods less obvious.526 Whilst factory organisation may have
been sufficient to bring together otherwise disparate workers at times of crisis
(usually   when   redundancies   were   threatened),   generally   the   workforce
struggled to maintain a constant influence over any wider themes.  
Such  constraints  also  meant   that   sectional  organisations  often  struggled   to
produce coherent policies even on straightforward “industrial issues”. Although
Beynon paints a picture of the Halewood stewards in the late 1960s as highly






First   mentioned   in   February   1967,   the   stewards   engaged   in   little   further
discussion  of   the   scheme  over   the   following  months,   despite   the   stewards

















which  involved a major  curtailment of   rights and would certainly  have been
sufficient to provoke a major dispute at other  factories and other  times, and
more the culture of the workforce at that particular historical moment. With a
relatively  inactive and conflict­averse  leadership,  it was difficult  to produce a
collective definition of MDW with which to stimulate resistance. 
Beyond such “industrial issues”, restraints were even greater. Senior stewards'
awareness  of   the   conditional   trust   that   had  been  placed   in   them,  and   the
















constitutions   of   both   Cowley   AEU   Shop   Steward   Committee532  and   the
anonymised factory featured in Batstone et al's Shop Stewards in Action.533 




the   long­standing  involvement  of   the  Longbridge JSSC  in  anti­racist  politics
(expressed in support for campaigns relating to South Africa, Zimbabwe and
US civil rights), engagement in this sphere was almost always restricted to the
fraction   of   overtly   political   stewards,   who   attended   conferences   or
demonstrations,   but   who   rarely   attempted   to   push   such   politics  within   the
factory. Even in more practical matters, negotiations with management reveal a
reluctance  to  deal  with   industrial  grievances  that   touched on race  relations.
Discussing a protest put forward by the (majority Afro­Caribbean) East Works
labourers  in  1967,   the  works  committee,  whilst  agreeing  off   the  record  that
black workers were excluded from better jobs because of a supposed lack of
“suitability”   for   fast­paced   production,   joined   management   in   denying   the
existence   of   a   colour   bar.535  Whether   or   not   the   Longbridge   leadership
genuinely believed the manifestly racist trope that semi­skilled production work











Sectional   bargaining   struggled   at   times  either   to   deal  with   broad   industrial
policy, or to facilitate significant political change for marginal groups. However,
contrary   to   the   idea   of   union   fragmentation   central   to   much   of   the
historiography, it still persisted for positive reasons. Workers' social practices
and  cultural  norms were  seen   to  be  an   increasingly  easy  means by  which
pressure could be put  on employers  to  treat  them more  fairly,  with workers
using   them  to  gain  more  control  over  everything   from health  and  safety   to
sickness and disability.  On occasion  the same practices could also produce
indirect  political   effects,   with   partial   disputes   like   the   Dagenham   sewing





on   the   basis   of   the  workgroup,   1960s   labour   relations   allowed   sections   to
sustain   substantial   sectional   autonomy,   allowing   for   small­scale   democratic
interventions,   and   even   encouraging   marginalised   groups   to   offer   some












they   occurred,   were   also   usually   costly   to   both   strikers   and   laid­off   non­
participants. However hard senior stewards and factory organisations tried to
control   the  use  of   sectional   social  power,   the   result   of   industrial   action  by
minorities  was often  widespread hardship.  Generally  speaking,  official   trade
unions and factory organisations were both weak on wider issues during this
period   and   struggled   to   solve   problems   that   went   beyond   the   immediate
concerns of the workshop.  
By   refusing   to   take   the  capacity   to  act  collectively   for  granted  and actively
looking in detail at how power operated at work, we can begin to see how it
shaped the development of workplace life. The nature of the organisations that




The  way   in  which   self­interest   operated   for  workers   in   the   post­war  motor
industry  was  a   priori  structured   by   their   workplace   cultures,   which   largely
determined who was and who was not included in their definitions of “we”.
Whatever the limitations of mid­1960s sectionalism, it  is clear that the social
power car  workers wielded reshaped their  social   relations and  the  forms of
domination  which  confronted  them at  work.  These  forms,   rather   than being





low­level  bargaining  into   their   industrial   relations structures,  while  displacing






members   to   create   institutions   and   social   practices   capable   of   generating
communicative consensus on a broader basis. The ways in which they did so













effects  of  sectional  activism,  employers and  trade unions  resolved  to  adopt
“productivity   bargaining”   (as  discussed   in  Chapter  Two),  moving   towards  a











direction  was   the   introduction  of  MDW as  employers  urgently  attempted   to
abolish   a   piecework   system   that   was   becoming   increasingly   disruptive   as
workers became more adept at shop­floor bargaining.542  Even at firms where
MDW had been in place for many years, the late 1960s saw reform. In addition
to   new  grading   structures,  managers   instituted   new  procedure   agreements
designed   to  mitigate   conflict,   raise   productivity,   increase   flexibility,   abolish
“restrictive practices” and generally formalise shop­floor bargaining. At Vauxhall




These   developments   coincided  with   a  marked   deterioration   in   the   financial
position   of   Britain’s   four   large  motor   firms,  with   their   global  market   share
significantly eroding. By 1970, total UK car production had been surpassed by
Germany, France, Italy and Japan,544 with output and profits declining in all four




new   circumstances   created   both   new   grievances   and   new   organisational













power  was based on sectional  wage militancy  that  would   largely  disappear
under MDW, with its annual agreements over wages. Productivity bargaining,





relations   reforms driven by  capital  and  the  state.  Building  on  their  existing,
sectionally­based,   organisations,   such   developments   encouraged   shop












of   the   1950s,     the   changing   forms   of   worker   organisation   and   collective
behaviour in post­war Britain have been comparatively neglected in much of the
literature. This is also true for the late 1960s and 1970s. Although the rising















in how workers went about  organising collective action  there  is  scant  more




action   is   taken   as   a   given.   Yet   as   our   detailed   discussion   of   sectional
bargaining   amply   illustrates,   bringing   about   strikes   of   any   kind   involved   a
complex process that depended on adequate social and cultural resources. As
we have seen, by the 1960s, workers had developed the capacity to regularly







factory  issues,  let alone respond  to  them. The shift   in gear  from generating




their  organisations,   such   that   large  strikes  became a   reasonable  course  of
action, and how did that affect the workplace as a habitus? 
Beynon and Darlington provide us with some idea of what that process looked
like   at   Ford   Halewood.   Beynon   describes   in   detail   the   build­up   to   and









Committee,   comprised   of   full­time   officers   nominated   by   22   unions,   had
negotiated   with   little   input   from   shop­floor   activists.   However,   in   1969   at











From 1968 onwards,   this  sort  of  strike became more common  in  the motor
industry  with  the number of   “major  strikes”  (totalling more  than 5000 striker
days)   rising   from  100  between  1962   and  1967   to  264   between   1968  and
1973.552 Alongside this new found capacity to engage in regular mass strikes,
workers   retained   their   old   tendency   to  engage   in   small   strikes,  which  also
substantially increased in frequency during this period.553 Finally, new forms of





economic   conditions   discussed   above,   as   the   imposition   of   productivity
bargaining created new forms of conflict. However, as Stoke's reaction to MDW

























































resolution'.562  Another  distinctive  feature  of   the Batstone  factory's  committee
related to its constitution, which included a ban on discussion of wider “political”
issues ­ a backlash against various unsuccessful interventions by the CPGB in
the   1950s.   Such   attitudes   no   doubt   contributed   to   the   parochialism  which
characterised activism there,  producing a moribund union branch  that  rarely
engaged in wider union issues, with 51 per cent of the stewards agreeing that
'the union is the stewards and members in this company'.563 





body   for   reconciling   sectional   interests   with   factory   policies.   Conversely,
external   relations  were   largely   determined   by   past   experience,  with   defeat
under a previous Communist­led regime fuelling cynicism towards engagement
with   politics   and   the   wider   union   movement.  Whilst   we   can   find   some
continuities  across   the  motor   industry,   these   two   factories  weren't   alone   in
adopting idiosyncratic organising styles. Even the JSSC, the beating heart of






































out   the   entire   company,   and   retiring   the  Rootes   name   in   1971.  However,
logistical problems and low productivity meant weak profits, and the company
was   subject   to   a  government   bailout   in   1975.566  Despite   the   travails   of   its













meeting's   minutes,   followed   by   matters   arising,   then   correspondence   and





different   unions,   elected   by   steward   or   branch  meetings   of   their   particular











similar   to   those   described   elsewhere   and   with   the   standard   executive
committee of convenors.570 However, the way in which the Stoke stewards used
these   institutions   and   the   social   practices   that   arose   around   them   were
distinctive and changed according to shifts in personnel, as well as in political
and economic contexts. As we have seen, despite Rootes being a relatively
peaceful firm in the 1960s,571  between 1966 and 1968 the  leadership of  the
JSSC struggled  to  impose sectional  discipline on  the workforce and   laissez
faire attitude had enabled some work groups to exert control over wages and
conditions.  The advent of MDW meant wages could no  longer be  improved
section­by­section and the factory organisation had  to take more responsibility
for negotiations. Thus from 1969, the Stoke JSSC became more pro­active at
























debate  by   the  mid­1960s,  attendance   rose  substantially  between  1966  and























little  effort   to  cultivate  activists,  and  left  more  militant  sections  to   their  own
devices.  However,   as   the   factory   leadership  became  more  pro­active,   they
required   more   participation.   Simultaneously,   as   intervention   in   sectional
disputes became more regular, members increasingly demanded stewards who
would act forcefully on the JSSC in defence of their interests. Confronted by
new   stewards   with   stronger   policy   preferences,   the   more   conservative
convenors were also “politicised”; forced to define their positions in more detail




















Such   open   arrangements   could   be   divisive   however,   and   the   stewards











within   the   factory   by  a  group  of  workers.583  The  earlier   permissive  attitude
towards sectional disputes began to disappear and problems relating to working
conditions,  management   and   discipline   become   a  more   frequent   topic   for
discussion. Whereas earlier the vast majority of sectional disputes had been left
to resolve themselves, convenors now raised these conflicts (at a rate of five
per   week)   in   their   reports,   with   votes   and   resolutions   offering   support   or















to   affect   decisions,   even   if   the   leadership   remained   relatively   static.   The
convening of mass meetings also granted the membership a consistent and
final   veto   on   any   policy   that   required   active   participation.   Contrary   to   the






factory   organisation.   This   meant   that   shop  meetings   became   spheres   for
delegation more  than decision­making.  Mass meetings,   revolving around an
address from leaders and a vote on a recommendation, were in some ways an
inadequate   replacement   for   the   intimate   two­way   conversation   of   small
workgroups. Regardless,  the JSSC, the negotiating committee and the shop
meeting provided an adequate if complicated means by which the workers at
Stoke   could   formulate   policy   and   react   to   change.   Stoke   attempted,   and
partially   succeeded,   in   reconciling   the   contradictions   of   discipline,   unity,
democracy and autonomy. 
Rover  Solihull   ­  Departmental   constituencies  and  senior  steward
authority
After World War Two Rover positioned itself as a modestly­sized manufacturer
of upmarket  saloon cars and utility  vehicles.   Initially based  in Coventry,   the
company expanded across the West Midlands during the war, building factories





assembly   factory.  Despite   being   comparatively   successful,   dependence   on
external  body­building  facilities saw Rover caught up  in  the 1960s mergers,
bought by Leyland­Triumph in 1967 and subsequently incorporated into British
Leyland. Rover's  industrial   relations prior  to   this period were not particularly
fractious and (depending on their politics) activists there recalled the 1960s as a
period of either moderation or disorganisation and both sides agreed that by the
early  1970s  substantial   changes   in  shop­floor  organisation  had  made  for  a
more active union.586 
Following   the  TGWU  takeover  of   the  NUVB,  almost   all   the   factory's   4,500
workers   had  been   brought   into  one   union   branch:   5/357;587  but,   every­day
decision­making rested elsewhere, with two TGWU stewards committees, one
for   the   production   stewards   and   another   for   the   indirects.  With   far   higher
attendances   than   the   theoretically   more   open   branch   meetings,   these





thinking   their   social   practices   in   response   to   new   economic   and   political
conditions. Although meetings of the production stewards' committee adopted
the   same   format   as   their  Rootes­Chrysler   counterparts   –  minutes,  matters
arising etc. ­ the content and social practices on display were shaped by the
modes   of   communicative   action   peculiar   to   these  workers.   Their   inaugural

















union organisation  between May and December.   In   fact,   in   the  absence of
meaningful   debate,   and   with   just   two   competitive   votes   in   8   months   of
meetings, it is difficult to gauge the level of support for committee policy. Such a
level of consensus seems astonishing given that the politics represented by the




Analysing   the   contributions   made   by   the   convenors,   the   lack   of   debate
becomes   understandable.   Meetings   were   short   and   the   issues   discussed


















trade unionism defy  stereotypes.   Indeed,  shop­floor  politics  at  Solihull  were



























the  limited  levels  of  organised opposition  to  Harris  and his  allies.  However,
without contested meetings there was little motivation for stewards to be active
both  within   their  section and on  the committee,  and  the Solihull  Production
















Despite   little   indication   of   prior   disagreement,   on   this   occasion   substantial
numbers of stewards felt the new deal had been negotiated without sufficient
consultation. The autocratic tendencies of the convenor could be seen in his







the stewards on  the P6  “A”  shift,   the expectation was  that  Ashworth  would
directly express their interests, and that it was on this department­based system













groups,   lined   up   behind   area   senior   stewards.   The   role   of   the   latter   was
reaffirmed, with various groups claiming  the statutory right   to have a senior
representative   for   their   area.   Old   divisions   were   also   reinforced   when
production stewards were elected for three of the four executive positions.595
Predictably  the result  of  such dominance by  the more numerous production












contributed   to   a   further   decline   in   the   dynamism   of   the   JSSC.   This   was
manifested in dropping attendance levels, which fell from 62 per cent in 1974 to







other  stewards  in censuring  the senior stewards  for conducting negotiations
behind closed doors in January 1977.599 




sold   in   various   forms;  as   the  Rover   3500,  Rover  2300  and  Rover  Vitesse























stewards   to   demand   support   through   the   SSC   for   disputes   with   wide
ramifications,  such gestures often had little effect. 
How far these social practices reflected the attitudes of the Solihull workforce is




steward   from  1959,   talked   of   apathy   as   a   contributing   factor   in   shop­floor
weakness at Solihull and Harris' authority may have stemmed from leading a
less active workforce, a  tendency which possibly had  its historical origins  in
Rover's more paternalistic management style  in the 1950s. If  some sections
and  departments  were  apathetic,   it   is  also  possible   that  members   in  more
militant departments responded to the nature of  the SSC by adhering more
closely   to   their   own   departmental   leadership.   The  minutes   for   1977   show
evidence   of   such   forcefulness,   with   workers   in   the   more   militant   SD1
department pushing for industrial action over shift patterns and being told to
contact their area senior steward.602 
As is central  to  this thesis, the form and social  practices of shop­floor  trade





reactions   to   it   were   always   complicated,   and   the   ways   in   which   workers
organised   moulded   discussions   and   structured   collective   action.   Like   the
stewards at Stoke, the leadership at Solihull attempted to reshape their shop
floor organisation to deal with the new social and political context of the 1970s,















manufacturing   process,   including  machine   tools,   components,   engines   and
bodies, as well as final assembly.603 The primary function of these employees
was the mass production of Austin­Morris branded motor cars, which meant, for
















leading   figures   established   over   the   course   of   the   previous   two   decades.
Authority   over   the   factory's  many   departments   resided   in   its   JSSC,  which


















electricians.607  Although   there   were   usually   sufficient   candidates   for   a
competitive election, the senior stewards from the three largest unions always




by any new generation of activists,  despite  the emergence of  an  IS  factory
branch there.609 Consequently, it was able to adapt relatively easily to the new




from   stewards,   then   recommending   a   return   to   work  while   they   put   their
argument  to  management.  Derek Robinson was  involved  in  such a case  in
1973 (one year prior to his becoming convenor), recommending to a group of
setters complaining about unpaid training in the auto shop that they 'resume




from  the  previous  period,   eschewing  mass  meetings   in   favour   of   sectional














make a decision (see  Figures 7  and  8  ­  records of votes for and against a
proposed one­day protest strike against In Place of Strife in 1969).612 Contrary
to much of the commentary on the supposedly tyrannical nature of workplace
trade   unionism   (see   Chapter   Two),   this   practice   seems   to   have   enabled




Figure 8: MSS.202/S/J/3/2/68, April 1969.Figure 7: MSS.202/S/J/3/2/68, April 1969.
decisions at both shop and factory level. On one occasion, in 1972, to decide
whether   to   accept   formal  agreement  on  MDW votes  were   taken  by  10036
workers in 21 different departments, of which only  five produced unanimous
results,  with most  having  lengthy debates (2.5 hours was  the average)  and
generating   competitive   votes   before   accepting   the   works   committee's
recommendation.613
The   social   practices   that   predominated   at   Longbridge   in   the   1960s   were
evidently sufficiently durable that no transformation such as occurred at Stoke
and   Solihull   was   required   when   new   industrial   relations   policies   were
established  in  the 1970s. However,  as with  the new organisational   forms at











agreements  became more  formal,   the  mediatory   role  adopted by  Etheridge
required ever more authority, especially as the financial position of the company












where   convenors   acted   as   low­paid   personnel   managers   has   been
acknowledged as a general feature of the steward system.617 
However,   it   was   during   this   period   at   Longbridge     that   it   became   most
developed. According to John Bliss, a left­leaning worker in the Cofton Hackett
works,   this   meant   that   despite   his   later   “red”   reputation,618  Etheridge's






exaggerated   by   the   advent   of   “Worker  Participation”,   introduced   by  British
Leyland in 1975 in order to involve union members in improving the company's
efficiency. 
Whilst   workers   generally   seem   to   have   accepted   some   elements   of   the














this was reflected in “unofficial  unofficial”621  wildcat strikes in defiance of  the
factory   leadership,   but  more   concretely,  where   critics  were  prevented   from





Works JSSC was  the most  authoritative and most  challenging  to  the works
committee,  explaining  in  a   letter  shortly  after   its   foundation   that   it  could  no
longer tolerate delays in obtaining redress for their grievances, adding that they
'appreciated  the ever   increasing amount of  work being placed of   the works
committee' and had therefore resolved to found a new sub­committee in order
to  help.623  Chaired  by  a  very  active  steward  named Les  Hughes,   the  East
Works JSSC sent regular resolutions outlining their various complaints to and
about   the  works  committee,   in  addition   to   involving   themselves   in   frequent
disputes.
Enabled by their already authoritative works committee, the senior stewards at
Longbridge   had   attempted   to   solve   the   problems   of   1970s   factory   politics















sectional   strikes  had   the   side  effect  of  drawing   leading  stewards   closer   to
management,  whilst  encouraging centrifugal   forces which  pushed groups of
activists   to   seek  more  autonomy.  As  at  Stoke  and  Solihull,   the  choices  of
workers   at   Longbridge   saw   their   organisations   take   a   different   path,   with






affordable cars  like  the Marina,   the Mini  and  the Maxi.  The assembly plant
employed around 8000 people, depending on programme624,  and despite  its
relatively   late  unionisation,   by   the   late  1960s  was   the   site   of   considerable
conflict, producing more strikes (386) between 1968 and 1970 than any other
factory of equivalent size.625 One obvious explanation for this strike proneness
was   the   emergence   of   a   militant   leadership   group.   In   1959   the   TGWU
convenorship passed to Bob Fryer, a more left­wing figure than his predecessor
Frank  Horsman.626  He  gathered   around   him  a  group   of   younger   stewards,



















































Chairman and   refrain   from  interrupting  or   swearing.636  These  changes  may
have  been   the   result   of   the  committee's   first   real  disagreement.  A  bumper
attendance on 3 March saw 150 stewards discuss the qualification rules for
seniority – vital in the event of redundancy or transfer – with the chair forced to





















Place of Strife –  were passed in  front of comparatively  large (a third above
average) crowds, whilst at a meeting half the size in 1970 Thornett's call for a
blacking   campaign   in   support   of   the   Pilkington   glass   workers'   strike   was
defeated by 11 votes to 20.639 The most likely explanation for such trends is that
like political minorities elsewhere, the militants at Cowley were not a radically
separate   caste   of   outside   agitators,   as   is   so   often   implied   in   the   various
dismissals of their influence (discussed in Chapter One), but were themselves
(like   the   IS   supporting   dockworkers   studied   by   Celia   Hughes640)   “ordinary
workers” and formed part a larger group of variably committed stewards and
members   with   personal   orientations   toward   particular   types   of   policies.
Sometimes,   heightened   interest   implied   a   strength   of   feeling   that   aided
militants; on other occasions it reflected strong opposition to a proposed action.



















which   you   [the  members]   are   all   a   vital   part,   and   only   with  membership
participation can we survive'.642 The central focus of efforts to improve factory
organisation  was branch meeting  attendance,  which   rose considerably   from
1972   onwards.643  With   fortnightly   meetings   and   branch   officers   active   in
producing and distributing a monthly journal, the branch was able to contribute







through  the  impact of wage restraint on the sewing machinists,   to  the paint
sprayers' claim for more relief time and the need for a new branch banner, even
finding   time   to  unanimously   condemn  the  bombing  of  Vietnam.645  With   the
exception   of   US   imperialism,   the   issues   were   similar   in   range   to   those
discussed by the Stoke JSSC, suggesting that both meetings served a similar
purpose. 
If   5/55   Branch   resembled   the   Stoke   JSSC   in   some   regard,   it   was   also
distinctive in ways that predicted later problems for militants. One feature was
the tendency of activists to pass resolutions of questionable relevance to many
members.   Aside   from   the   aforementioned   opposition   to   the   bombing   of












simultaneous condemnation of  Allende's  Popular  Frontism and  the Pinochet




More   problems  were   sometimes   generated   indirectly   through   the   branch's






workgroups   to  engage   in   conflict  whenever   they   felt   need.  This   included  a
policy against “job measurement”,  which  in March 1973, saw stewards note
with approval a strike where operators stopped work to prevent their jobs being
timed by  industrial  engineers.650  In a factory with hundreds of strikes a year
such attitudes were a recipe for division. Whilst small disputes may not have
cost participants much, when added to occasional one­day “political” strikes,
regular  small­scale “downers”651  could  irritate  more conflict­averse members.
The most dramatic manifestation of this tendency came in August 1972, when



















caused   friction  between   them and more  moderate   trade union  officials,   the
minutes   for  1973 documenting  serious arguments  with  district  organiser  Bill
Thompson and  local  official  Dave Buckle.653  Following complaints   from Reg
Parsons (a former SLL member turned moderate) that senior stewards were not
using  their  positions  'to  encourage workpeople  to  work and use procedure',
TGWU officials   finally  decided  to  split   the 5/55 branch.654  In  1974,   the new
branch   was   then   ordered   to   elect   its   convenors   by   secret   ballot   of   the
membership, with Parsons winning 1,881 votes in the resulting election, ahead
of Fryer's 824 and Thornett's 407.655 
I   will   discuss   the   precise  meaning   of   Parsons'   victory   in   greater   detail   in
Chapter   Five.   However,   it   is   worth   examining   here   the   organisational
ramifications of his defeating two advocates of less restrained militancy. The
purpose of BL introducing MDW in 1971 had been to exchange a flat day rate
for   “scientific   management”   and   continuous   production,   with   wage   rises










gave  workers   some   control   over   line   speed,   but   only   provided   they  were
prepared   to   engage   in   constant   conflict   to   maintain   the   status   quo.   The
convenor   election   took   place   in   April   1974,   just   as   Thornett   was   being




his  defence, disrupting supplies  from the body plant  and rapidly closing  the
factory, leading to further press attacks on Thornett.657 Piled on top of the very
real  problems of  sustained militancy,   the crisis  of  1974 evidently  convinced
large  numbers  of  Cowley  workers   that   they  were  better   off  with  more   co­
operative leaders.
The problem Parsons now faced was the mirror  image of that which the old







constant,   demoralising,   concessions.   Cowley   activists   on   both   sides   found
themselves   trying   to   strike   an   awkward   balance   between   militancy   and
moderation,   activism   and   apathy.  Whilst   the   Longbridge   stewards   tried   to










Factories   in   different   firms   and   locations   confronted   similar   problems   and
developments  in   the period of productivity  bargaining.  After   the spread of  a
sectional  system of  shop­floor  bargaining  during   the  1950s  and  1960s,   the
defining features of which had been shop democracy, sectional autonomy and
weak factory­level organisation, from 1968 onwards the situation changed as
employers and governments  launched projects aimed at  reducing  the social
power of workgroups and stewards. Leaders and activists now struggled with
the  process of  creating unified  organisations capable  of  delivering cohesive
policies for problems now posed at factory, company or state levels, particularly



















action.  Alongside  this  new militancy came new discipline,  as   the  Halewood
assembly   plant   JSSC   looked   to   restrict   sectional   militancy   that   leaders
considered   “daft”,   a   tendency   that  grew   in   the  1970s   into  a   thoroughgoing
conservatism.





instructions   to   stewards.   In   contrast   to   Halewood,   where   factory   leaders
provided   much   of   the   impetus   for   JSSC   activities,   Stoke's   shop­floor
organisation was more of a parliamentary system, where workers sent  their
stewards as delegates  to  democratically   fight   their  corner  on  the  joint  shop
stewards'   committee,   a   practice   which   sometimes   generated   considerable
disunity.   Later,   like   their   counterparts   on   Merseyside   they   became   more
bureaucratic in their suppression of dissent. 
Factories   like   Solihull   found   other   ways   of   resolving   the   conundrum   of
comprehensive bargaining. Whereas Halewood acted in a democratic centralist
manner,  using  stewards   to  promote  policy,  and  Stoke  organised   itself   in  a
parliamentary way with stewards   representing their particular shops, Solihull
departmentalised its activism, splitting the workforce into large groups defined
by   product,   and   creating   several   powerful   full­time   area   convenors.   This
produced   a   vibrant   sectional   activism   but   left   the   factory   convenor   as   a
dominant and fairly conservative break on broader action. With departmental
218
committees,   strong   convenors   and   a   prosaic   stewards'   committee,   Solihull
faced   the   dangers   of   top­down   trade   unionism   and   dropping   levels   of
participation. 
Whilst   these organisations underwent  substantial  change during   this  period,
Longbridge maintained a degree of continuity. Having entered the late 1960s
with an authoritative works committee already in place, the need to produce a
body   capable   of   generating   coherent   factory   policy   was   less   urgent,   so
Longbridge activists  merely  adjusted  the existing balance between sectional
liberty  and central  dispute  management   to  give  slightly  more  weight   to   the
latter,   attempting   to   reconcile   autonomy   and   leadership,   militancy   and
moderation,   democracy   and   authority.   The   result   was   a   system   that
perpetuated slightly more liberty at sectional level than elsewhere but that was



















same conundrum – how to exercise social  power effectively at a   factory or
company level whilst preserving the democratic rights of individual workers. All
these   formulations   both   enabled   and   constrained   behaviours,   encouraging
mass strikes led by JSSCs, works committees or unions, encouraging sectional
action   to   different   degrees.   Some   of   the   tendencies   had   the   effect   of
democratising factory policies. The range of  issues which car workers could
affect increased in line with their striking power, as sustained mass strikes and
factory   occupations   became   a   more   realistic   option.   On   the   issue   of
redundancy,   for   instance,   both   governments   and   employers   seem   to   have
become   very  wary   of  mass   redundancies   and   factory   closures   during   this
period, with the former offering bailouts to keep factories open and the latter
becoming   more   generous   with   severance   pay.   BL's   evidently   reluctant
concession of mutuality in its MDW agreements was testament to their fear of





On   the   other   hand,  with   negotiations   now   in   the   hands   of   central   factory
organisations,   it   became  more  difficult   for   individuals   to   shape   the   form of







cent   in   all   industries  won   their   position  by  defeating   an   incumbent659)  with
incumbents only generally ousted when they had significantly lost the trust of
their membership. In any case, the ability to elect one steward amongst several
hundred  to   represent  your  section  was no  real  substitute   for   the system of
small­group assemblies which had developed earlier and in factory negotiations
workers were effectively denied the right to develop consensus through group












emergence of a  layer of  leadership which encouraged militancy of all   types,
whilst   the   authoritative   Longbridge   works   committee   maintained   its   long­
standing role into the 1970s. These organisations all encouraged peculiar types
of  activism.  Solihull   tended   to  departmentalise   its  bargaining  and  produced
relatively few factory strikes, whilst Halewood JSSC's dynamic activism within






organisation   and   social   practices   served   different   purposes   and   enabled
different    democratic   interventions,  making  a  substantial   contribution   to   the
behaviours  for which the motor  industry became so notorious.  In  the earlier
period sectional decentralisation was perpetuated because of its usefulness in
allowing   widespread   democratic   control   over   both   unions   and   conditions.





through   the   agency   of   the   workers   themselves,   a   transformation   that
substantially affected the operation of domination at work (but rarely outside
work). The forms of social organisation adopted enabled each group to draw on
a   particular   configuration   of   collective   power,   allowing   both   groups   and





been   able   to   uncover   how   the   forms   of   social   relationships   these  workers
developed determined the state of their individual and collective agency within











In   1968,  Birmingham­born  Colin   Fitzer  went   to  work   for  Rover   in   Solihull.
Previously Fitzer had worked for a small firm making cabinets, where he was
dismissed after arguing with the owner over a wage deduction for absenteeism.














nature  of  post­war   labour  militancy we need  to   look  beyond straightforward
economic motivation and explain the nature of workers' agency and thus the
context in which attitudes and orientations were formed. Having explored the












shop­floor   culture.   In  Chapter   Three   I   emphasised   the   centrality   of  worker






work.  In   analysing   those   cultures   this   chapter  will   look   beyond   the   binary
established   in   much   labour   history,   in   which   “ordinary”   workers   are
counterpoised  with  an   “extraordinary”   fraction  of  motivated,   class­conscious
activists.  I  will  outline  the ways  in which  the majority  of  car workers  in  this
period   adopted   many   ideas   about   the   world   of   work   that   were   often   in
themselves “extraordinary” in terms of wider British society and the discourses
discussed   in   Chapter   Two,   and   how   the   politicisation   of   activist   workers
reflected those ideas as much as it did their external political affiliations.
The first two sections of this chapter will look at decentralised bargaining. The
previous   chapter   drew  attention   to   the  ways   in  which   sectional  democracy
enabled workers to exert control over substantial areas of their working lives,
but placed limits on interventions in wider issues beyond the boundaries of their
own   departments.   Drawing   comparisons   between   individual   responses   to
sociological   surveys,   life   history   interviews   and   the   documents   of   shop





commentators.  Shaped by  the social  practices of  shop­floor   trade unionism,
such concepts contributed to the “transgressive” behaviours that came to be
defined as the “British disease”.  









factory   organisations   discussed   in   Chapter   Four   created   spaces   in   which
activists could persuade workers to participate in broader and more politicised
activism. In the final section, I will focus on the period between 1974 and 1977,
drawing out   the different  perspectives workers developed  towards how their
social organisations operated.
In  both sections,   I  will  argue  that   the   relationship between social  practices,















and  In  Place  of  Strife.  Alongside  unofficial   strikes,   this   commentary   raised
concerns  around  union  power,   the   freedom of   individuals  under   the  closed
shop,   the   capacity   of   British   companies   to  modernise   and   the   continuing
tendency toward “wage drift”. Surveys of car workers' opinions in this period
indicate  a  degree  of  acceptance of   these  narratives.  For   instance Vauxhall
assemblers interviewed for  The Affluent Worker displayed attitudes conducive
to industrial co­operation, with the overwhelming majority (79 per cent, higher
than   non­Vauxhall   workers   interviewed)   agreeing   that   'teamwork   means
success and is to everyone's advantage'.663 Although Vauxhall's dispute record
may indicate they were more co­operatively minded than most, even at more
militant  Halewood  in  1967,  ordinary members  thought  Ford a comparatively
“understanding”   employer   and   expressed   satisfaction   with   their   pay   and






discussed   in   previous   chapters.664  Often   drawing   on  The   Affluent  Worker








for   its   politically   unremarkable   participants.665  As   I   have   noted   earlier,   this
tendency to discern “collective instrumentalism” in worker attitudes, often allied
to explorations of “politicised militancy”, is strongly echoed by the voluntarist




historians   have   claimed,   the   idea   that   most   strikers   saw   themselves   as
“ordinary   workers”   engaging   in   nothing   more   than   “reasonable”   collective
bargaining is not without merit. Similar sentiments were also expressed, even
amongst   strongly   union­inclined   workers,   in   interviews   conducted   by   Paul





















that   was   deemed   transgressive   by   that   same   society,   a   dichotomy   that
demands an explanation.
In  part,   the  answer  might  be   found   in   the  different  meanings   that  workers
attached to these ideas. Once we explore the calculative nature of Wren's “co­
operation”  in more detail,  we discover  the different  uses  that  abstract   ideas











these   concepts   were   employed   in   ways   that   saw   workers   inadvertently
engaging in behaviour regarded as disorderly by outsiders.













became   more   widespread,   workers   began   to   demand   steadily   increasing
wages, often as a response to the successes of others. As living standards rose
expectations rose with them, fuelling further demands. 
These   workers'   previous   experiences   left   many   with   the   impression   that
improvements  were  a  product  of   collective  agitation   rather   than  employers'
largesse, and the argument that present conditions and future gains depended




















concessions   only   in   the   face   of   pressure.   After   disputes   this   feeling  was
reinforced by attributing successful outcomes to union action. At meetings of
the  Cowley  Assembly   TGWU  Branch   (5/55)   congratulations  were   regularly
offered   to   groups   who   had   won   concessions.   In   1968   monthly   meetings
featured   reports   on   an   increase   for   ambulance   drivers   in   March,   on   an
agreement   on   waiting   time   for   piece   workers   and   a   pay   increase   for
maintenance workers in April, as well as advances for women working in the
Service factory and in the canteen.674 
The   rationality   displayed   in   everyday   disputes   often   fed   on   a  wider   value
system in which the better conditions that workers enjoyed in the 1960s were
attributed to the effective trade unionism of the past, a message communicated
through collective memories of  factory  life.  Just as dockers and miners  told
stories of more oppressive eras to emphasise the importance of trade unionism,
car  workers  drew  on   their  own  stories  of   the   “bad  old  days”   to   stress   the






















at   Longbridge   and   elsewhere   had   become   accustomed   to   the   idea   that
belligerence was necessary in order to get fair treatment on a wide range of
issues.  These  attitudes   towards  collective  bargaining  partially  explain   rising
union density and assertiveness. Historical experiences of success were also
important   in   reinforcing   these   basic   ideas,   to   the   extent   that   organisations
sometimes deliberately reminded their members where wage increases came
from.679  The   combination   of   using   these   values   in   an   instrumental   way   in
disputes and  their  active propagation after  disputes  reinforced  the  idea  that
industrial action was an effective way of resolving problems.  
Autonomy as a value
Although   these   historical   experiences  and  widespread  attitudes  explain   the
importance of trade unionism to car workers, there was another layer to shop­
floor   politics   in   this   period.   Expectations   of   increasing   affluence,   and
dependence on collective bargaining were important elements of the “normal
trade unionism” that formed part of mainstream public discourse, but they do
not   entirely   explain   the   readiness   of   car   workers   to   engage   in   so­called
“problem” behaviours. Yet, as we have seen, the practice which defined British
industrial relations in this period was the “transgressive” unofficial strike, a more







the   piecework   system.681  However,   wage   structures   do   not   wholly   explain
changes   in   collective  behaviour   in   this  period.  For   one   thing,   despite  both
Vauxhall and Ford adopting flat hourly rates under Measured Day Work [MDW],






become  increasingly   involved   in   sectional  activism  from  the   late  1950s,  an
indication that the phenomenon was not as connected to defending craftworker
privileges   as   has   often   been   imagined.683  The   gradual   disappearance   of
demarcation divisions and the decline in wage differentials from 1967 to 1977
certainly indicates that sectionalism was an ineffective tool for such purposes
and   largely   confirms  Cronin's   view   that   labour  militancy  was  mainly   about
'levelling up'.684  


















for   granted,   is   the   ease   with   which   solidarity   and   organisation   could   be
produced  at  workshop   level.   The   section­by­section  advances  made   in   the
1950s gave most activists a sense that a good steward with a committed work­
group could make substantial improvements, and by the 1960s sectional strikes




up   to   12  months   to   process   cases,685  the   sense   of   control   that   sectional
bargaining  offered was  crucial  and can  be seen particularly   strongly   in   the
positive attitudes many developed towards piecework. 






























in   September   1967   reflected   how   decentralised   social   practices   became
incorporated into workers' moral values, shaping their sense of what their rights






an   informal   meeting   has   been   unfavourably   received,   we   are
compelled  to ask  that   the Works Committee  raise  this matter  on
behalf   of   our   members...   We   would   raise,   among   others,   the
following points...'Why was there no attempt at prior consultation?...
On what grounds are some superintendents claiming … that there is
or   has   been   an   agreement   made   in   the   factory   between
management and union officials, that 6/6 per hour be paid for the
introduction   of   new  work   or   where   new  materials   prevents   the
688 Martin Kavanagh Interview, 21 February 1982.
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piecework  condition   from applying?...   Is   there  or  has   there  ever
been an agreement –  except an ad hoc agreement some years




























from   the   wider   union,   democratic   mandates,   fairness   between   sections   –
reflected different elements of the moral value system that lay behind Britain's
strike   pattern.   Mandates   were   particularly   crucial.   Stewards   arguing   with
Longbridge  management   in   1965   frequently  made   reference   to   what   their
members had told  them to argue  for and what  they might  be persuaded to










but   declared   they   were   'going   to   the  membership'   but   did   not   'think   the
membership would consider it reasonable in terms of what they [were] giving in
return'.692  Such patterns were peculiar   to   the  form of  workplace culture  that
existed   in   this   period   and   despite   being   ostensibly   economic   in   nature,
incorporated   not   just   a   sense   of   collective  material   self­interest   ,   but   also
considerable social and moral content.
The effects of autonomy





feature   cases   during   this   period   where   sections   either   demanded   higher
discipline   or   enacted   their   own   punishments   against  members   defying   the
workgroup. The crimes cited were of various types ­ ignoring votes, refusing to
contribute to union funds, not paying subscriptions or strikebreaking   – but all
ultimately   amounted   to   a   refusal   to   accept   collective   decisions.693  In   one
example at Stoke such behaviours even included collective sanctions for being




of   shop­based   democracy   complicated   interactions   with   senior   stewards,
factory organisations and official   trade unionism. Although as both Reid and
Laybourn   have   argued,   such   relationships   could   never   be   reduced   to   a
simplistic   opposition   between   rank­and­file   and   bureaucracy,695  the
independence afforded to workgroups contributed to the idea that trade union
officers were not always to be trusted, a sentiment particularly intense amongst
an  enthusiastic   left­wing minority.  The activists  who  wrote   to  the   libertarian
socialist magazine  Solidarity  were particularly vehement in this regard, using

















the   Company   this   time'.696  Jeffreys'   attitude   echoes   ideas   prevalent   at
Halewood,  where  many   interviewees habitually  described  senior  officials  as
'bent'.697




Cowley   Assembly   (where   relationships   would   later   turn   so   sour),   full­time
officials   and   stewards  were   generally   on   good   terms   in   the  mid­1960s.699










Workers   were   generally   engaged   in   workshop   decision­making,   and   their
attitude towards higher levels of the union reflected a mixture of lack of interest,
and confidence in their own autonomy, something that could manifest itself as
bloody­mindedness.   Peter   Ashcroft,   an   NUVB   steward   at   Luton,   wrote   to















line   speed   and   poor   conditions   as   motivation.   Management   subsequently
conceded a small increase in the form of “condition money”.703  




activists   there,   and   confirms   the   dominance   of   conventional   ideas   about
industrial   relations   at   Luton.   This   was   especially   evident   in   factory­level
decisions, like the company­wide secret ballot held to decide the outcome of
national   pay   negotiations.   The   reaction   of   Ashcroft's   section   is   interesting.
Despite   the   factory   having   decided   to   accept   the   company's   offer,   his
department opted to walk out, suggesting that his argument that they should




“bad   conditions”   is   also   significant.   The   department   evidently   organised   a
workgroup   meeting   in   which   they   defined   the   national   pay   dispute   in   a
distinctive way. Rather than the discussion being primarily structured by public
discourse   about   industrial   relations,   the   meeting   was   shaped   by   shared
personal experiences of bad working conditions. That is, the more isolated from

















made   issues   intensely   local,   generally   excluding   thoughts  of  wider   themes
regarding union power. Thus, even where workers theoretically accepted many







that   the   company's   new   job   evaluation   scheme  had   been   applied   unfairly,
failing to recognise the sewing machinists' skills.705 River Plant convenor Henry









That   the  media  were  only   capable  of   rendering   this  as  a  more  universally
comprehensible idea – “equal pay for equal work” ­ reflects how factory politics







after  they had “won”  their  dispute by reaching an agreement on equal  pay,
many of the strikers remained frustrated that their grading grievance remained
unrecognised.709  Their  discussions  at   shop   level   had  shaped   their   attitudes
towards the dispute in ways which only fully made sense in the context of their
historically­specific pattern of shop­floor bargaining.  
Many   small   strikes   at   this   time   drew   on   this   capacity   to   define   issues   in
localised ways which rarely touched on broader industrial relations issues. Not










factory   trade   unionism   to   make   arguments   that   were   highly   localised.   In
negotiations, stewards cited problems like: the increasing burdens of their job,





These  parallel   definitions  of   everyday   situations  sustained  a  wide   range  of






called   to   attend   ten   different   disputes,   each   one   reflecting  highly   localised
versions of union values.712  The variety of these disputes is testimony to the
myriad   different   types   of   friction   decentralised   bargaining   was   capable   of
generating: many that week were economic, in most cases direct requests for
more money, and could very easily be incorporated into Goldthorpe's “collective
















10  years  old  and   the  machines   in  bad  condition,   there  was  a  shortage  of
components and a bad flow of work. The stewards were also worried that no
new jobs were being allocated to them and that surplus labour might soon be
thrown   up.   The   works   committee   responded   by   asking   Piniker   if   he   had
registered   a   formal   “failure   to   agree”   with   management.   'Considerable
discussion'   ensued,   after   which   the   works   committee   recommended   an
immediate return to work for negotiations, a solution that Piniker agreed to try
and persuade his members to adopt.713 This dispute was in essence simple.
Management's   failure   to   supply   adequate   components   meant   work   was





Prior   to   the  walkout  Piniker   and   his  members   had   clearly   discussed   their
situation   in   a  way   that   went   beyond   economic   calculation.   The   variety   of
associated grievances implies an open discussion, which touched on general
job and wage security. The stewards argued that the company had no right to
expect   workers   to   be   present   at   the   factory   without   providing   them  with
adequate machines and sufficient supplies with which to earn their wages, and
also demanded equal priority in the distribution of work. Finally, worries over the
likelihood of  redundancy  led  to  the expression of  fears for   the  future and a











discontent over a broad range of  issues.715  Thus,  in the background to “pay
disputes”  we  find  a  set  of   implicit  moral  assertions  which  diverge  from  the
simple economic rationalities typically attributed to them. Behind the cylinder
heads grievance was  the  injustice  that despite being available  for work,  the
company was failing in its duty to provide the requisite materials. The rectifiers
thought   it   unfair   that   the   increased   skill   content   of   their   work   was   going
unrecognised and announced their  intention to return unilaterally  to their old
practices. Neither section was arguing simply for a wage increase and both had















organisations,  which   allowed   discussions  within   their   workshops   that   were
partially isolated and conducted in terms of ideas specific to their experiences.












Practices   and   values   simultaneously   shaped   the   pragmatic   rationalities
employed   by   workers   during   discussion   and   collective   action.   Sectional

































bargaining was  institutionalised. At Ford,  this manifested itself  in a series of
new agreements on grading, discipline and productivity that aimed 'to regain





Coventry plants  in  1967 and 1968.   In   the words of Rootes director  George
Cattell, the purpose of the reforms was the 'complete elimination of bargaining
about  money   or   payment   between   the   operator   and   the   rate­fixer'   putting










assumed that  this period saw a relatively uncomplicated shift   from bartering
over piece rates to annual wage negotiations and effort bargaining, there was
no easy transition between different types and scales of activism, as different
forms   of   action   often   required   the   creation   of   new   solidarities   and   values.
Indeed,   although   the   difficulties   firms   later   experienced   in   implementing
productivity bargaining have sometimes been attributed to the same causes as

























increased,   discipline   tightened   and   timekeeping   became   stricter,   without
forming a general critique.
This parochial  approach was mirrored by  the behaviour  of  senior  stewards.
TGWU convenor Nelson declared in November 1967 that 'no steward should
discuss MDW on his own basis or sanctions may be put against him.'725 Nelson

















walk   out   over   a   dirty   workshop   or   a   rude   supervisor,   but   not   to   discuss
substantial changes to wage structure and work organisation. 
In another sign of  the complicated nature of “collective self­interest”, despite
acknowledging   the   adverse   effects   of   the   plan   on   earnings   and   working
conditions, AEU convenor Wild urged colleagues to accept it because: 'MDW
was being introduced at BMC and in time would spread throughout the motor





details.  This  shared  idea,   that   factory activism should  try   to   restrict   itself   to













to   be   disappointed.   For   every   workplace   where   schemes   were   adopted
peacefully, another was forced to  impose it   in the face of opposition from a





changes, articles  in  the factory newspaper  Branch News  reflected their  line.





ten­page  article  went  on   to  articulate  how  the  new agreement  would  allow
management to move labour and determine work standards unilaterally, and
that  new  “penalty  clauses”  meant  unofficial   collective  action  would   result   in
disqualification   from   holiday   bonuses   and   lay­off   pay.   Summarising   the
changes,   the  authors  wrote   'we  will   have  no  control  whatsoever  under   the
Company's proposals. Manning is controlled by the Company through individual
Company­fixed man assignments  and  the  speed of   the   line   is   in  Company
hands.'730
Branch News'  rejection of  MDW was  forthright  and detailed.  Emphasis was
repeatedly laid on the right to be consulted over change, the diminished role of














similar   objections.   'Under   the   existing  Piecework   system  we   have   a   large
measure of control over how much wages we will earn, the amount of work to
be performed for these wages, and the opportunity to re­negotiate piecework
prices   if   the   material,   or   means   of   production   change,   or   by   mutual
agreement.'733 The leaflet went on recount the history of workers' power at the
factory, won by the struggles during and after the war, and culminating in the




























that,   for   economic   reasons,   it  will   not   have   piecework.   Therefore   the   only
means of  maintaining   [it]  … would  be  through … an all­out  strike   involving
everyone in the plant.'736  The senior stewards evidently had little appetite for























combination   of   moderate   leadership   and   timely   concessions   helped
management bring in MDW relatively painlessly.
At the assembly plant, the implacable hostility of the senior stewards generated
more   conflict.   In   September   1970,   1,200   trackworkers   were   sufficiently
convinced by the leadership's opposition to walk out in protest. A week later,
management   raised   the   proposed   hourly   rate,  meaning  workers  were  now
fighting against a substantial pay rise. The strike nevertheless continued for a
further seven weeks and ended only after pressure from full­time officials  to
return  to  work.741  Management  then pushed  the scheme through  the official
dispute procedure and  imposed  it   in January 1971. Having struck against  it


























scheme   is   evidence   of   the   adoption   of   decentralised   bargaining   amongst
women car workers (see Chapter Four),  in spite of  the patronising attitudes
towards  them  from male stewards  reflected  in   the  reference  to   the  'girls'.746


















substantial  minority  against)   to  allow discussions on MDW and  to  send  the
sewing   machinists   back   to   work.748  Negotiations   then   continued,   with   the
women taking the opportunity to remedy long­standing grievances surrounding
low   pay   in   exchange   for   being   the   first   and   last   group   to   fight  MDW   at
Longbridge.   They   eventually   reached   a   satisfactory   conclusion,   winning   a
substantial interim pay rise whilst the finer details of MDW and mutuality were
ironed out.749
At   Ford,   although   the  wage   structure   had   always   been  MDW,   the   1960s
reforms prompted a similar reaction, again demonstrating that ideas of sectional
autonomy and   shop  democracy  were  derived  as  much   from  the   spread  of
certain cultural values amongst the workforce as from the industrial relations
system   itself.   In   1969,   the   firm   introduced   a   new   pay   and   productivity



























As elsewhere, Ford workers'   response  to productivity bargaining reveals  the
importance of social practices in shaping the rationalities and behaviours of car
workers. Crucially these  responses only begin to make sense to us when we
move   beyond   conceptions   of   straight   “instrumental   collectivism”   and   place




accustomed   to   sectional   independence   and   relatively   conservative   factory
activism stymied discussion of MDW and restricted objections to aspects of the
new   plan.   At   Cowley   Body   strong   traditions   of   sectional   rights   created






at Cowley Assembly and Longbridge  into conflict  with  BL management  that
reflected their specific factory organisations. Finally, at Ford the introduction of
productivity bargaining in 1969 produced conflict on an unprecedented scale,
derived  perhaps   from  the more  precarious  state  of  workers'   rights  at  Ford.
Although each factory had similar motivations to resist or accept productivity








era   of   'enlightened   self­interest'   (see   Chapter   2)   with   comprehensive
agreements   improving  efficiency  and   reducing  conflict.754  For  managers   the
expectation was that the new regimes would allow them to exchange higher
wages for greater efficiency,  by removing worker  resistance to new working
practices.755  For  most  union activists,   the  key during  negotiations  had been
securing a future for sectional democracy and maintaining a degree of control
over   their   lives at  work.  Negotiations over   the  implementation of  MDW and
productivity bargaining reflected these concerns. Confronted by mass conflict at
Cowley,   partial   disruption   at   Longbridge   and   potential   unrest   elsewhere,
management made concessions. The most important of these was the general
principle of “Mutuality”. During their campaign against MDW, one of the major






incentives  workers  were   offered   to   accept   the  new  scheme,  BL  agreed   to
consult   over   line   speed,   a   promise  which   subverted   the   scheme's   central
purpose;   the  re­establishment of  control  over  production.  Thus  the changes
reflected not only the desire of the state and employers to restore order through
better   labour   relations   policies,   but   also   the   ways   in   which   workers   had
reshaped the scheme; either through negotiation or confrontation.756 












operation...   in  advance and   the  appropriate  steward  will  be  advised  by   the
Senior  Foreman'.  Finally,   the  steward  would  be permitted   to  check  that   'all
conditions   are   normal   and   that   the   study   will   reflect   normal   operating
conditions'.758  Agreements   like   this   conceded   considerable   formal   rights   to
workers, building on and superseding the “custom and practice” negotiations of















in   many   cases,   new   arrangements   stimulated   a   response   in   factory
organisations, where activists remade their social practices in order to conduct
factory trade unionism on a larger scale. Both the new agreements and the new
organisational   capacities  were   reflected   in  attitudes   to  working   life  and   the
shifting values of this period offer us substantial insight into the forms conflict
took within the motor industry, beyond immediate economic motivations. 
The  extent   to  which   the  sectional   values  of   the  mid­1960s  determined   the
eventual form of productivity bargaining ensured that substantial elements of
the   old   system   were   perpetuated.   Indeed,   this   was   precisely   what   many
stewards envisaged when  they  talked about   “mutuality”.  The Cowley senior
stewards celebrated  their  new agreement,  shaped by worker   refusals   to   let
management conduct industrial engineering studies,762  in  Branch News:  'This










or an agreed  temporary arrangement.   If   the shop steward on the
section uses his veto on a proposal the Company then has the right
to try and negotiate a temporary agreement so that the job can run.
If   after   a   genuine   attempt   to   get   agreement   on   this   basis   no
agreement is reached the change cannot be implemented.764
Sentiments of a similar nature were echoed by senior stewards from other BL
factories,   including  figures on  the right   like Eddie McGarry,   the convenor  at
Triumph Canley, who told journalists in 1971 that without mutuality the MDW
system  was   'akin   to  modern   slavery'.765  For  most   BL   activists,  MDW was
unwelcome but with mutuality stewards and their sections were at least free to
negotiate  over  workload  and  working   conditions  within   their   department,   in
much the same way as they had over pay in the previous period.766
These   attitudes   seem   to   have   reflected   a  wider   consensus   that   stretched
beyond senior stewards, translating into a more general rights­based version of
the decentralised bargaining workers had practised in  the 1960s.  It  severely
impeded   the   implementation   of   productivity   bargaining   as   envisaged   from
above, as arguments over prices and lieu rates were replaced by workgroups
disputing work standards. At Longbridge, where workgroup culture had been



















think   of   workload   as   an   adversarial   concern,   with   stewards'   opposition   to
“speed up” coming to the fore. In factories like Stoke the system's emphasis on
driving production forward produced hostility.  In 1971 Gerry Jones, a TGWU





could  be   forced  up  and  pressure  put  on   less  able  workers.769  This   sort   of
political  writing   drew   on   the   popular   culture   of   the   shop   floor,  which   saw
productivity as an area of conflict with their employers ­ perhaps the greatest













you   can   to   get   the   track   going   –   get   it   going,   it's  money...'. 770  Shop­floor
documents from Longbridge also show disputes in this vein, with pieceworkers
complaining about management's inability to provide a steady flow of work and
















drift'   that   Tolliday   also   sees   happening   in   Ford's   large   factories.775  This
phenomenon  often  manifested   itself   as   a   simple  withdrawal   of   consent   for














also now disappeared.776  Others   recalled a  more general   lack  of   interest   in






to  stop  work  early  having   finished  their  quota,778  a  practice  apparently  also
common  elsewhere.779  Another  group  of  workers   interviewed   in   the  Solihull
Paint Shop claimed that some engaged in secret drinking.780 Alison Gilmour's
study of  work culture at Chrysler  Linwood features similar  attitudes  towards
productivity   with   other   examples   of   this   lack   of   interest   in   management
objectives;  workers'   claiming   that   theft,   sleeping  and  drinking  at  work  were
commonplace.781  Although   Gilmour   counsels   caution   with   regard   to   such




















wider   support  was   unlikely   for  workers   caught   “bang   to   rights”.783  Popular

























produced   by   stewards'   organisations.   A   works   bulletin   produced   by   the











resist  any  attempt   to  erode   the  working  conditions   that  we  have
established   and   to   insist   that   ALL   agreements   are   honoured...
UNITY and VIGILANCE are the WATCHWORDS.'785 
This handbill is indicative of a wider moral sense that agreements constituted










pay.786  Similar   problems  were   also   a   feature   of   discussion   on   the  Solihull
Production SSC, where workers complained when the company failed to fulfil
their   responsibilities   over   transfers,   provision   of   boots,   safety   problems,
upgrading, health and safety, time study arrangements, demarcation and even
the   tea   trolley   service.787  Not   all   of   these   conflicts   related   specifically   to
agreements but they spoke very clearly of the new expectations that workers
were developing. Whereas in the 1960s members fought in defence of “custom
and practice”,  by  the 1970s demands were being articulated  in   the  form of
fundamental rights, without which management should not expect them to work.
The   result  was   often   a   situation  where  workers  would  walk   out  whenever
conditions were unacceptable, as described by Eddie Squires:. 
One of the main things you used to have there [in his department]




























These conflicts  could  easily  be  aggravated by  a sense  that  petty  violations
anticipated graver changes. From 1971, management at Cowley and elsewhere
found   that   formal   agreements,   far   from   averting   conflicts   by   channelling
disagreements   into   formal   bargaining,   actually   caused   them.  Whilst
management   complained   that   “status   quo”   clauses   (which   left   production
unchanged   until   after   agreement)   prevented   them   from  making   necessary
adjustments to production, workers claimed that management regularly violated
formal deals. Consequently, much conflict concerned not new demands, but the
defence of  existing  agreements.   In  summer  1973,   there  were  a  number  of
disputes   at   Cowley   along   these   lines.   One   incident   in   the   Mechanical
Maintenance Department concerned a breach of the discipline procedure by a













and  a  matter  of   principle.  Trivial   because   it  was   just   one  man  and   just   a
reprimand, a vital  precedent  because  the car  industry had a  long history of
supervisors   abusing   their   powers   and   a   matter   of   principle   because   the
company was breaching a long­standing agreement, part of the promise given
to   the  workforce  as  a  condition   for   their  work.  Such  a  dispute  could  have
several  after­lives  and  often  demonstrated   to  workers   the  need   to  buttress
formal rights through everyday activism. That same summer was marked by










A similar  determined  attachment   to   the  status  quo  can be  seen  elsewhere
during   this   period,   with   a  strong   sense   of   formal   rights   becoming   more




















the   company   to   compensate   them   for   having   to   stop  work   as   a   result   of
management   provocation.   Such   demands   represent   the   culmination   of   a



























sectional   dispute   could   now  potentially   raise   issues   related   to   factory­wide
agreements, meaning an increase in the number of local workshop problems
discussed by the JSSC. Having barely discussed any sectional dispute at all







major  strikes  was  never  straightforward,   the  moral  values  that  underpinned
sectional action could sometimes also be mobilised in support of large factory
disputes, particularly over broken promises. Certainly the Stoke IS branch used










The   Stoke   stewards   were   not   always   the   most   successful   in   persuading
workers to take strike action, but the idea behind the bulletin – that it was the
company   breaching   agreements   and   depressing   living   standards   that   lay
behind the need for strike action – built  on the kind of values workers were
using   in   their   everyday   disputes   and   did   produce   major   industrial   action
elsewhere.   Between   1970   and   1974,  Department   of   Employment   Gazette







widened  the   range of  subjects   to  which  workplace­specific  values could  be
























Alongside   the   Heath   government   expressly   committing   itself   to   allowing
unprofitable   firms   (“lame ducks”)   to  go  bankrupt,   car   company  profits  were
weak throughout most of the early 1970s. British Leyland first confronted the
problem of  rationalisation at a gear box  factory,  Thornycroft   in Basingstoke,
Hampshire. Having only acquired the plant in 1962, by the summer of 1971 the















every  section  of   the  working  class  –   to   rally   to   our   cause',   and  asked   for









sackings  were   neither   inevitable   nor   fair  was  becoming   entrenched   in   this
period.   Workplace   occupations   seemed   a   reasonable   step   to   take,   and
meaningful preparations to take over factories were made by stewards at other






















reasonable   supervision   and   unexacting   work   standards,   they   were   also
expected to guarantee a full week's work and full job security. Developing in
conjunction with an expanding capacity on the part of worker activists to use






motor   industry   all   contributed   to   the  politicisation   of   the  everyday,   imbuing
seemingly mundane events with deeper meanings. This helped generate not
only the industry's strike record, but other forms of politicisation, as shop­floor
ideas   about   trade   unionism   became   less   parochial   and   new   interventions
became   possible,   including,   between   1969   and   1974,   19   overtly   “political”
strikes”.810  Although   sometimes   initiated   by   trade   union   leaders,   executive


































campaign   against   the   act.   Tony   Bradley,   the   left­wing   chair   of   Cowley
Assembly's 5/55 Branch wrote to members after the strike on 1 March 1971
attempting   to  bring  home  the   “industrial”   ramifications.  Reaffirming standard
trade   union   practice   that   members   shouldn't   cross   picket   lines,   Bradley





















This  Government   is   determined   to   implement   anti­working   class
laws, they are determined to teach all of us a lesson for daring to try
and maintain  and  improve our  standard of   living.  We must  stand
together or we will go under.818 
Bradley's   arguments   reveal   both   the   opportunities   for   politicisation  and   the
limits   of   political   strike   action.  As  with   other   disputes  we   see   the   by   now
customary denial   that  conflict  was sought  or   initiated by   the  workers,  citing
attempts to avoid strike action. Politically, the act was painted as a ploy by the
















Ultimately   the  strikes  and  protests  against   the   Industrial  Relations  Act  had
causes similar to those of elevated strike levels more generally during the early
1970s. Making use of new social practices, workers could now discuss issues
on   a   scale   that   went   beyond   the   workshop.   Then   because   ideas   about





and  with  many  workers'   experiences  of   their   own employers.  Campaigners
were also careful to present the legislation as a case of politicians interfering
with   workers'   collective   rights,   thus   failing   to   abide   by   the   long­standing
(imagined) separation of the industrial and political realms. Activists sought to
shift   the  boundary  between  the   two  in  order   to   industrialise   the  political  by
accusing governments of   interfering  in  issues pertaining  to  industry.  Even  if
most workers saw themselves as only  legitimately concerned with “industrial













were   released   following   the   threat   of   a   general   strike,   the   1974   Labour
Government decided that it was better off repealing the act.820  It is not totally







used  the  shop  steward  every   five  minutes...  he'd   take   it   on  and  he'd  walk
straight  into the office.'821  Usually, Webb recalled, the steward only bothered











































































and  Mullins  collated  all   the  material   he  had  on   the  act,  and  gave   talks  at











That   such  experiences  were  generated  by   factory   life   can  be   seen   in   the
propaganda  produced  by   the  parties  some of   them  joined.  The  pamphlets,
bulletins and rank­and­file papers produced by groups like IS, the WRP and Big
Flame all drew on the genuine values of the shop floor, which they then fed
back   to   fellow   workers   in   slightly   more   politicised   ways.   Big   Flame's
propaganda at Halewood reflected this, politicising the everyday, drawing on
























and therefore viewed in  the wider context of  industrial  power politics.  In  the
context   of   an   ongoing   contest   between   the   workplace   organisation   and
management, and at times (for instance, with regards to the Industrial Relations
Act) between the trade union movement and the state, for Big Flame members
seemingly  insignificant events  took on a new dimension. Despite being  in a
minority politically, the values and the rationality they espoused in this kind of
story remained, I argue, a part of wider workplace culture, their political ideals
representing   just   one   strand   of   a   value   system   capable   of   containing   a














of   the   time workers who advocated such  ideas  found only a marginal   role.
Even when strike levels rose during the “high tide” between 1968 and 1974, the
values of shop­floor trade unionism were a more natural fit with the politics of
more   pragmatic   characters.   “Apolitical”   attitudes   like   those   of   Halewood






For   other   workers,   the   continual   invocation   of   high   principle   in   mundane
disputes could be jarring. Steve Gallant was dismissive of the role of the far left,
'I was aware of militants or leftists if you like who cost me money, and other















“responsible”   CPGB   was   typical,   as   was   their   distrust   of   younger
Trotskyists. Yet, as he acknowledged in his remark about instant coffee,
both were an intrinsic part of the same world, with the same expectations







two   principal   factors.   In   addition   to   external   causes   (inflation,   taxes,   full
employment,   incomes policies),   it  was  the  one  period  when car  workers   in
many factories developed both the motivation and capacity to engage in the
intense democratic practices necessary to sustain collective action and a broad






also   constantly   being   reminded   of   long­standing   ideas   about   strikes   being
fundamentally   “industrial”   in   purpose.  Within   the   context   of   the   1970s   the
boundary   between   what   was   considered   industrial   and   political   shifted   to
incorporate wider types of collective action. However, this expansion in what
workers could legitimately look to affect through collective action was always







collapsed  from £51m to  just  £2.3m, whilst  Vauxhall's   losses  increased  from



















organisations  and  shop­floor   cultures.  The most   conspicuous shift  was   that
more   difficult   circumstances   strengthened   the   arguments   against   strikes.
Although signs of fading militancy could be seen at other factories,843 at Cowley,
where activists had most encouraged militancy, the backlash was most fierce.










My colleagues  and   I   at   that  plant   (Cowley)  may  be   forgiven   for
thinking that the union official's task is primarily to keep us in full
employment. If this is the case, I am wondering how it is possible


















accusing   Alan   Thornett,   Chairman   of   5/55   Branch,   of   behaving
undemocratically: 'There are people holding responsible positions [at Cowley]
presenting   the  wrong   image  of   our   organisation  with   increasing[ly]   harmful





of  1974  the   forces  ranged against   the   leaders  of  Cowley Assembly  TGWU
multiplied.   Following   a   dispute   on   the   Marina   line,   management   accused
Thornett of provoking wildcat strikes through the pages of  Branch News, and
















local  and national  press,  and Thornett  became a minor  celebrity.851  Cowley
workers' partners and children demonstrated against militancy, bearing signs
reading: 'don't strike – work', 'sack the militants' and 'get our dads back to work
now'.852  The  Cowley  wives'   campaign   illustrates   the   extent   to  which  many
women   were   excluded   from   the   alternate   public   sphere   shop­floor   trade
unionism had created and, ultimately, from occupational class identities more




































large numbers of   their  members  'having a direct   influence  in   their  election'.
They   ordered   fresh   elections   for   the   convenor's   position   by   secret   ballot
(unusually)  of   the whole membership.857  The result,  a  resounding victory  for
Parsons, was greeted with general approval by the local and national press, as
well  as by local TGWU officials.858  For some,  including Parsons himself,   the
victory  of   the   “reformed   Trotskyist”   represented  an  eternal   truth  about   the
majority of the workforce at Cowley, that they were also hostile to the minority
of  militant  activists  who   led   the  workers'  organisation   there.859  For  Thornett
himself, the defeat could be explained by the opprobrium that had been heaped
upon him and the WRP by the press and the union over the course of 1974.860
There  are  elements  of   truth   in  both  explanations.  Press vilification  and  the
TGWU report were probably convincing to a lot of workers and support for the
wider policies of the WRP was clearly restricted to a small minority. Yet the
militancy   of   the   past   five   years   had   necessarily   drawn   on   some   genuine
support. Indeed, on the section where Thornett was best known, the transport






















reducing   conflict.   Moderates   like   Parsons   profited   from   the   hostile   public
discourse discussed in Chapter Two, where militancy was seen as disruptive
and   shop­floor   democracy   as   compromised.   The   perception   of   anti­strike
worker  Ron Hill  that   firms should  'listen   to   the  lads who do  the work   for  a
change instead of the bloody shop stewards' was not uncommon, and echoed
similar attitudes regularly voiced in print and broadcast media.862 Whilst these
sorts  of  views had always been expressed,   in   the   intimate  setting  of  small
workgroup meetings adept stewards could frame disputes in localised terms to
which   the   press   narratives   seemed   less   relevant.   Now,   as   workplace
organisations began to confront wider themes and engage in major disputes,








TU),  a  rank­and­file group which hoped  to  reform the assembly plant union
movement (chiefly by expelling the WRP), advocated a form of activism which
combined   an   appreciation   of   basic   trade   union   values   with   a   rejection   of
extremism  and   a   determination   to   avoid   unnecessary   conflict.   The   second
edition  of   their  bulletin   in  June 1973  reflected  these aims,  opening with  an
article about a Plant Attendants strike which they had supported. 
Before   striking,   these   people   patiently   took   the   dispute   through
procedure and in giving the required notice of intention to strike, they
delayed   their   action   so   as   not   to   disqualify   other   workers   from
receiving their Spring Holiday pay. The strike was officially backed at




People   feel   dissatisfied  with   the   cost   to   them  of   other   people's
disputes. The real reason for this dissatisfaction is that it is one more
to add to May Day, the I.E.'s strike, the Tuning strike, the Body Plant











only   interested   in   preserving   good   and   secure   pay   and  working
conditions for themselves.865
ORMO­TU expressed  the need  for  moderation within   the same overarching
values as their militant opponents did, accepting that ultimately their experience
of work was moulded by collective bargaining. In contrast, whilst discussions of
the   Industrial   Relations   Act   had   emphasised   the   need   to   strike   against












militancy  offered  opportunities   for   new   types  of   collective  action  and  more
radicalised ways of thinking, it also opened the door for activist moderates to
assert   themselves.   This   could   be   reflected,   as   it   was   it   was   at   Cowley






the shift  of  tone  in organisations  like the Halewood Assembly JSSC and,  in
1975­76,   in  dropping strike   levels  more  generally.867  As   losses   from strikes
mounted and the economic situation became more difficult, support for militant
policies faded,  amongst  both  the wider membership and  the majority of   the
more  pragmatic   stewards.  That   two  of   the  most   influential  moderate  union
leaders at Cowley, Reg Parsons and Service Factory convenor John Power,





the  mid­1970s   reflected   the   variety   that   existed   within   the   boundaries   of
workplace culture at that time. Previously, the growing authority of factory­level
institutions had encouraged shop­floor cultures which saw a broadening of the
range   of   issues   seen   as   important   to   the  workgroup   and   the   factory.   As
industrial expansion in the motor industry ground to a halt, the more developed




process   that   accelerated   as   bailouts   and   nationalisation   brought   more
government pressure to bear on the workforce. 
Emerging from near bankruptcy thanks to the involvement of the state, Chrysler





BL,   revamped collective  bargaining  procedures  were  dictated  by   the  Ryder
Plan, drawn up by a group of leading managers, politicians, civil servants and
national trade union officials. In line with its mixed origins the plan envisaged a
successful  expansion  and  investment  programme,  coupled  with  a  more  co­
operative   industrial   relations   culture,   to   be   secured   through   “workers'











There   is   no   doubt   that   what   attracted   some   of   these   activists   was   their
perception   that,   whether   through   managerial   incompetence   or   lack   of
investment,   many   of   the   motor   firms'   problems   were   self­inflicted.872















had  been   schooled   in   a  political   party   that   had  been  advocating   “workers'
control”   of   various   types   since   the   1940s.874  As  Robinson   put   it   in   his   a





































they could use workers'  participation as a  'persuasion area',881  and planning


























general   idea  that   car  work  was  merely  a  means of  making  a   living,  which
carried   little   intrinsic   interest.885  Car   work,   whilst   generally   boring   and
monotonous,  was often relatively untaxing and well   remunerated, and many





mainly   to  moderate   activists   and  Communists.   The   former   saw   conflict   as
intrinsically  damaging and  the  CPGB had  long held  an  ideological  belief   in
productivism, which held  that  only   the workers could “fix”   inefficient   firms.887





distancing   themselves   from   members   who   wished   to   see   their   interests
represented   a   more   straightforward   way.   Communists   who   rejected











who are naïve and shallow minded enough  in political  outlook  to
think that because they can sit and listen to a few [important] figures
…   that   we   are   indeed   now  masters   of   our   fates   and   our   own
destinies   and   all   that,   and   of   course   it's   an   absolute   load   of
rubbish.889
Conclusion
These  differing  attitudes   towards  participation  and   the  social   contract  more
broadly that emerged in the mid­1970s, were reflective of wider cleavages in
terms   of   values   and   attitudes   that   changing   forms   of   organisation   were










war   labour   militancy   in   the   British   motor   industry,   we   must   look   beyond








pragmatic   reasoning   employed.   Having   established   such   a   context   in   my
previous chapters, it has become clear that the voluntary actions of workers,
particularly   a   fraction   of   engaged   trade   union  militants,   were   central   to   a
creative   process   whereby   workplace   culture   in   the   motor   industry   was
transformed,   allowing  workers   to   collectively   remake   their  workplaces.   The
forms of social power created by this process structured the workplace as a
habitus, determining how workers took collective decisions and the parameters
within  which   these   decisions  were   taken.   This   chapter   has   addressed   the




Previously,   study   of   worker   attitudes   during   this   period   had   two   principal
problems:  firstly,  although attention has been paid to working­class attitudes
through   sociological   surveys   since   the   1960s,   these   surveys  were   usually
conducted in line with the tendency we noted in Chapter Three, where scholars
often  assumed   the  existence  of  a  process  whereby  an  orientation   towards
“privatism” replaced “solidarity” in working­class communities.890 Consequently,
scholars have often sees novelty in “affluence” and “privatism” and tradition in
collectivism,   whilst   neglecting   emergent   forms   of   the   latter.   Secondly,   this
concentration on privatism above all else has usually gone hand­in­hand with
the   inclination   to   prioritise   the   direct   economic  motivations   behind   labour










and   1970s  also  managed   to   produce  new  (not   re­animated)   cultures   of
solidarity   and   collectivism,   ones  which   challenged   accepted   conceptions  of
work,   the  economy and  democracy.  Thus,  although  Cronin's  argument   that
alternative ideas around co­partnership, participation or workers control never














in   which   governments   and   companies   desperately   needed   productivity
bargaining to improve output,892 worker belligerence in this period can be traced
to a shifting attitude towards the very nature of work and employment, and an










to   resolve   issues   of   authority   and   autonomy,   democracy   and   leadership,
moderation and militancy, centralised factory organisation was as likely to help
as  to  hinder  militancy and,  particularly   in  the mid­1970s,   leaders at  various













were   possible   in   British   workplaces   in   the   1960s   and   1970s;   that   new
collectivisms could thrive in the post­war period, not just as a re­animation of
previous   solidarity   but   as   new   inventions   in   their   own   right;   that   the   new
solidarities and the values underpinning them where as crucial in determining
the form of militancy as were economic and political reforms, and finally, that







historiography   of   post­war   Britain   downplayed   the   historical   agency   and
subjectivity   of   participants   in   labour   militancy.   Highlighting   a   tendency   to
prioritise the influence of the state and capital as an explanations for increased




industrial   relations,   first   by   looking   at   the   changing   societal   norms   which
structured how workplace activism was understood during this period and then








newspapers,  politicians  and  social   commentators   looked   to   re­establish   the
historical context in which activists operated, particularly how they were seen
within   the  elite  public  discourse  of  newspapers,  national  politics  and  social






proffered   a   normative   conception   of   how  workers   should   behave,   dividing
activities and behaviours into those that were deemed reasonable and those
that were not.  In spite of the tendency in much of the historiography to assert
that post­war  labour activism generally  fell  within  the bounds of “reasonable
industrial   issues”,895  study  of  public   discourse   revealed   the  extent   to  which
labour  militants   in   general   and  car  workers   in   particular   increasingly   found





their   contribution   to   “British  values”,  groups   like  dockers,  meat  porters  and
busmen  were  attacked   for   striking  outside  of   formal   bargaining  machinery.
During the 1950s and 1960s press and politicians settled on “unofficial” strikes,
restrictive   practices   and   closed   shops   as   defining   features   of   “the   British


















and   was   blamed   for   everything   from   the   failures   of   nationalisation,   high
government   spending,   inflation,   pensioner   poverty,   weak   governance   and
general misery. Consequently, it became increasingly difficult for trade unionists






British   disease”,   fulfilling   all   the   stereotypes   of   Britain's   industrial   relations'
problems: militant shop stewards, unofficial strikes and low productivity, and, as




Despite   the   constant   message,   from   newspapers,   television   media   and
politicians, that “the public” opposed militancy, car workers continued to behave
in “problematic” ways. I have argued, contrary to some historians,899  that their









areas   of  working   life,   and  militant   activism  was   still   regularly   punished   by
dismissal at many factories long into the early 1960s. Trade unionism was often
marginal   to   workplace   life   and,   unable   to   draw   on   more   confrontational
collective cultures, workers often displayed fatalistic and deferential attitudes.
From the mid­1950s onwards, union activism intensified, a change I explored in
terms of  Bourdieu's  notion  of   the  habitus.901  By   thinking  about  which  social
practices and cultural  norms made strikes “common­sensical”,   I  was able to
reconstruct   the  process  by  which  workers   built   their   collective   capacity   for
sustained  industrial  conflict.  One example of  this sort  of   transformation was
seen in attitudes towards piecework prices, where by using ordinary in­work
socialising and regular discussion over the nature of the wage­effort bargain,
activists   were   able   to   persuade   co­workers   that   piecework   timings   were
something   which   they   had   a   right   to   bargain   over.   These   discussions
empowered  workshop   representatives  –   shop   stewards  –   to   take  on  more
negotiating functions, and eventually,  to  lead members into collective action.
Later,   this   activism  would   spread   as  workers   looked   to   draw   comparisons
between the rights and rates achieved in different workshops and factories. 




demanding  improvements.  Pragmatic   rationalities  evolved  to   incorporate  the
idea   that   “external   bargaining”   conducted   by   trade   union   officials  was   not
enough,   and   that   decision­making   and   action   within   the   factory   were   a










post­war   period   has   generally   been   understood   as   a   period   in   which











most   pragmatic   trade   unionists   built   upon   foundational   values   –   solidarity,
discipline, collectivism – prior to employing calculative reason.
Organisations and culture










the  1960s and  1970s.  Having emphasised  in  my  introduction   the  extent   to
which workers exercised agency in the social processes which defined post­war
monopoly  capitalism,   in  Chapter  Four   I   responded   to   the,  often  superficial,
treatment of power in the workplace that has been characteristic of much post­




begun   to   emerge.   Mass   participation   in   decentralised   workshop­based
democratic structures helped many car workers secure substantial new rights,
spreading considerable social power amongst groups of people often excluded
from   the   formal   authority   structures   of   the   post­war   settlement.   In   most
workplaces   organisation   centred   around   four   central   practices:   steward
representation, shop meetings, mandated delegates and autonomous action.
Each   helped   ensure   that   power   was   accessible   and   dispersed.   Steward
representation, a form of peer democracy in which authority was vested in a
fellow worker,  made democracy  immediate  and  accessible.  Shop  meetings,
sometimes   with   consent   from   above,   sometimes   clandestine,   were   small
enough   to   allow   for   full   discussion  and   direct   decision­making.  Delegation,
where   representatives  were  sent   to   negotiate  with  specific   instructions  and
reported  back prior   to   taking  decisions,  ensured continuous control.  Finally,
autonomy,   secured   in   part   due   to   the  protection  of   the   larger   factory­wide
organisation  and  its  prohibition  on strike­breaking,  enabled a  degree of  de­
centralisation which empowered small groups within these larger organisations.
At   their  most  effective  such practices  delivered  to  workers  a  new sense of








including   financial   hardship   for   strikers   and   laid­off   co­workers,   and   strict
workgroup   discipline.   Oversight   was   also   important   in   a   system   defined
essentially by its unevenness. Created workshop­by­workshop, generalised by
a mixture of collective action and employer concession, de­centralised activism
depended   heavily   on   the   character   of   particular   workshops   and   their
representation. It follows that sectional activism bore the marks of its creation
and  was structured by   the  histories  and  the  experiences of  participants.   In
many cases this unevenness mitigated against unified action on an industrial








resist   attempts   to   raise  output.   In   response  employers   looked   to   formalise
industrial relations through “productivity bargaining”. In what opponents referred
to as an “employers offensive”,906 firms looked to restrict the uncontrolled power
of   stewards   and   workgroups   to   determine   their   immediate   conditions   by
formalising bargaining. The way in which many car workers reacted to this shift





workers adapted their  social  practices to new circumstances.  In most cases








practices, adopted  in order  to bring about similar effects,   involved trade­offs
between different priorities, forcing workers to choose between democracy and







the   top­down   nature   of   the   post­war   settlement,   workers   still   carved   out
considerable social power through their activism and the operation and the use
of that power shaped how they both thought and acted. Having spent much of
the 1950s organising  their   industry  workshop­by­workshop,   the activism that
became characteristic of car workers during the 1960s reflects the nature of
that   creative   process.   Along  with   de­centralised   bargaining   and  workgroup
democracy, many workers came to share a common set of values  in which




change,  for   recognition of  skill,   for   rewards  for productivity,  and  for  fairness
between  groups.  Crucially,  althou  Rubinstein  gh  many  of   these  behaviours





not   respond   automatically   to   new   circumstances   in   line   with   any   obvious
collective interest, but in ways that were structured both by their history and by
the  interventions  of  groups  and  individuals.  As   firms  introduced  productivity
bargaining to both eliminate everyday conflict and drive up output, their success
was  mixed,   if   not   entirely   absent.   Resistance,   often   based   on   the   same
conceptions   of   autonomy,   democracy   and   consultation   that   had   animated
previous   unofficial   strikes,   re­shaped   schemes   designed   to   operate   in   a
disciplinary   fashion.   The   fundamental   premise   that   management   should
determine production speed and labour load was undermined as car workers
laid claim to their now habitual levels of job control. 




consultation,   to   safe,   clean   working   conditions   and   to   negotiated   change.
Autonomy and democracy were sustained as values, whilst productivity – the
most important category for the schemes' authors – became for many workers
a purely  managerial  concern and a subject   for  adversarial  bargaining.  As a





mass  conflict  became more  common.  Just  as  decentralised bargaining  had
earlier   reflected   the   nature   of   organisations   and   their   social   practices,   the
development of new factory organisations in the 1970s enabled new forms of
activism. As JSSCs became more dynamic they were able  to  involve entire
factories   in  sectional   issues,  contributing   to  a  politicisation  of   the  everyday.
When   defined   by   a   bigger   constituency,   minor   issues   often   came   to   be
understood as symbolic of wider principles, setting crucial precedents for the
future.  Simultaneously,  as organisations developed greater  social  power  the






power  of  workers'  organisations expanded  the   realm where   they could  and
should  meaningfully   influence   events   changed,   generating   new   behaviours
including “political” strikes against government policy and factory occupations
against closures and redundancies. These events had uneven effects on the
















shared moral  values and attitudes.  Finally,  participant  workers  acting  within








motor  industry and participated  in  labour militancy provide us with  important
insights into life in post­war Britain. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that
concepts like “economism”, “industrial issues”, politics, managerial prerogatives




1977,   the   Labour   government   hired   South   African   businessman   Michael













labour   activism   often   being   subsumed  within   a   narrative  where   “privatism”
generated   by   affluence   steadily   eroded   long­standing   occupational
solidarities.909  With   this   thesis   I   have   uncovered   ample   evidence   that   the
changing   nature   of  workplace   politics   is  more   complex   than   this   narrative
allows.   The   connection   between   post­war   Keynesianism   and   mass   trade
unionism was less automatic than is often implied, and new solidarities often
had  to  be  made prior   to   the  emergence of   the   labour  militancy and social
practices   that   so   marked   mid­twentieth­century   Britain.   The   cultures   that
emerged were also far more  interesting than  ideas of economic pragmatism
and mainstream progressive  liberalism can  fully encapsulate. The shop­floor
culture of   the British motor   industry,  which generated  its  own moral  values,
cultural  norms and pragmatic rationalities, was specific  to  those workplaces,











mutually­reinforcing   ideas.   This   culture   often   differed   substantially   from   the
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